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Abstract 
 
The partnership rhetoric is widely spread in development studies and practice. 
This thesis revisits the debate on partnership using Honneth’s theory of 
recognition. In order to shed light on the role of recognition in donor-recipient 
relations, Sino-Malawian cooperation on infrastructure projects in Malawi is 
exemplarily examined. A discourse analysis of original expert interviews with 
Malawians is conducted. These interviews with representatives of local 
development nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and civil servants were 
conducted by the author in 2013. The analysis reveals the important role of 
recognition in the constitution of a development partnership; in addition to 
awareness of material and social aspects. This includes the consideration of 
symbolic aspects such as visible progress, the importance of fostering 
transparency of agreements towards the population and the awareness of risking 
infringement of sovereignty by conditions on aid. 
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 1. Introduction 
 
“If I've learned one thing covering world affairs, it's this: The 
single most underappreciated force in international relations is 
humiliation” (Friedman 2003) 
 
The emerging relevance of the People's Republic of China (PRC/China) in global 
processes is widely discussed in many current debates in political science. One of 
the strongly controversial issues is Chinese engagement in African countries: 
Scholars' assessments of Sino-African relations include positions like ongoing 
exploitation, empowerment, re-balancing and neocolonialism. These various 
positions show how debates on development are connected to debates of Sino-
African relations. This thesis concentrates on the nexus of the two debates: current 
approaches to development and Sino-African relations using the example of 
Malawi. 
Sino-Malawian cooperation started only in 2008. The starting point for the 
cooperation was a package deal on infrastructure projects in Malawi, including a 
parliament building, a conference center, a stadium, a university and a road from 
Karonga to Chitipa. So far, hardly any scientific research has been conducted on 
the relations between Malawi and China. Hence, this thesis aims at introducing 
the case of Malawi into debates on Sino-African relations. On an empirical level, 
Malawian perspectives on the package deal will be analyzed so as to understand 
how experts in the development sector evaluate the projects. 
On a theoretical level, this case is used to shed new light on current 
debates on development. The discussion focuses on the partnership approach to 
development which is of great importance in current debates. The concept of 
partnership is commonly accepted for its instrumental value of fostering aid-
efficiency. Yet, partnership is not so much discussed from a normative 
perspective focusing on procedural aspects of development assistance and the 
constitution of donor-recipient relations. Honneth's theory of recognition explains 
interstate relations by focusing on recognition and humiliation as decisive factors. 
His theory has not yet been discussed with regard to donor-recipient relations. 
However, it sheds new light on the partnership approach and allows for a better 
understanding of the notion of partnership. Therefore, in this thesis, the theory of 
recognition serves as an analytical lens to study donor-recipient relations, 
exemplified by Sino-Malawian relations.  
Based on the empirical and the theoretical goals of this thesis, the 
following research question can be formed: To what extent does the analysis of 
Sino-Malawian relations from a recognition perspective provide insights to 
develop a complementary understanding of the partnership approach in 
development debates? 
So as to answer this research question, I first of all give an overview of the 
current state of research on Sino-African relations and position myself in the field. 
On this basis, I introduce the theoretical framework of this paper which mainly 
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focuses on the partnership approach to development as well as Honneth’s theory 
of recognition. Thereafter, I discuss the theory of science of my thesis. This leads 
to the methodological approach of the research project. The relevance of 
recognition for development debates and politics is discussed by analyzing semi-
structured interviews which I conducted doing fieldwork in Malawi during the 
months of February and March 2013. Representatives of Malawian development 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), civil servants of the Malawian 
government and Chinese actors involved in Sino-Malawian cooperation were 
interviewed on their insights and evaluation of the cooperation. Based on the 
interviews, a critical discourse analysis sheds light on discourses connected to 
recognition. The last chapter of the thesis presents and sums up the results with 
the purpose of providing an answer to the overall research question. 
State of research: China in Africa 
One facet in globalization debates is the emergence of new global actors. Over the 
past decade close attention has been paid especially to the rise of the PRC. Several 
aspects of China’s role on the global stage have been discussed. A frequently 
recurring topic is China’s quest for resources, mainly for crude oil (c.f. Moyo 
2012, Villoria 2009:532). Several African countries own abundant resources of 
crude oil, minerals and metal. Sudan, Angola and Zambia for example have had 
long-term relations with China and exported resources to the PRC (cf. Kragelund 
2009, Asche et al. 2008: 24, Obiorah 2007). There exists a tremendous body of 
academic literature on ‘China in Africa’ (cf. Alden 2007, Taylor 2009, Brautigam 
2011a, Harneit-Sievers et al. 2010, Manji et al. 2007, etc.). Several academic 
journals have published articles and released special issues analyzing Sino-
African relations.
1
 Research institutes and projects focusing on Sino-African 
relations were founded, as e.g. the Africa’s Asian Options project (AFRASO) by 
the Center for Chinese Studies of Stellenbosch University (Center for Chinese 
Studies).  
Academic debates on the matter of Sino-African relations focus on a wide 
variety of topics, country cases and theoretical classifications. Important topics 
discussed are for example matters of economy, development and human rights. 
Scholars mainly discuss Chinese engagement in African countries with regard to 
its impact on African countries. In terms of economic consequences, export of 
African resources, import of Chinese goods and impact of Chinese loans are 
widely discussed (cf. Asche et al. 2008, Ayers 2012, Giovannetti 2009). 
Regarding human rights, matters of arms trade, peacekeeping, labor conditions 
and the Chinese principle of non-interference play a major role in academic 
debates (cf. Taylor 2009, Chidaushe 2007, Hackenesch 2013). 
In terms of theoretical classifications, scholars’ assessments diverge, too. 
Several scholars react to a popular classification of China as a neocolonial power, 
yet most clearly reject this strong attribute (c.f. Moyo 2012:156-157). While many 
underline China’s responsibility concerning human rights issues, environmental 
problems and trade imbalances, most scholars first and foremost stress the 
                                                          
1 Just to name a few examples: Journal of Contemporary African Studies 29(2) 2011; The China 
Quarterly vol. 9; Euopean Journal of Development Research. 21(4) 2009.  
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responsibility of African leaders who have scope for action and the responsibility 
to shape the cooperation for the benefit of their people (cf. Taylor 2009, Lemos et 
al. 2007).  
According to more optimistic takes, global rebalancing occurs due to East-
South partnerships which challenge western dominance in processes of 
development, economic cooperation and globalization: “the rise of emerging 
societies is a major turn in globalization and holds significant emancipatory 
potential. North-South relations have been dominant for 200 years and now an 
East-South turn is taking shape” (Pieterse 2011:22; cf. Chidaushe 2007). Similar 
to this argument, some scholars underline that new opportunities for African 
countries evolve because new actors, ideas and practices emerge with the 
emergence of China (e.g. Brautigam 2011a:310). 
A less common understanding of Sino-African relations argues that global 
economic and political structures force China to expand the market and allocate 
capital as well as resources. This can be best summarized in this argument: “the 
‘new scramble for Africa’ together with the rise of the BRIC countries 
themselves, are ‘linked and collectively shaped by broader transnational capitalist 
dynamics, in particular by the establishment and intensification of transnational 
corporate-controlled cross-border production networks’” (Ayers 2012:24).2 
Almost all of the scholars mentioned above also discuss the impact of the 
cooperation on African development. Many African countries are classified as 
developing countries or least developed countries (LDCs) (OECD 2012) so that 
debates on Sino-African relations often border on or meet questions of 
development. Some scholars also explicitly analyze Chinese development 
assistance. Deborah Brautigam has done extensive research in the field of Chinese 
development assistance. Her work is placed at the nexus of aid, investment and 
trade, while focusing on development assistance and other forms of aid (cf. 
Brautigam 2011a).  
The above points out a tendency in debates on Sino-African relations: 
Many of them are often quite normative because they relate to matters of 
development in African countries. Scholars take different positions as to the role 
of China: How to assess China’s impact? What are desirable outcomes of the 
cooperation?  
Very recent publications on Sino-African relations move away from 
concentrating on the impacts of Chinese engagement and assessing China’s role. 
This may be due to several scholars underlining the fact that China just as Africa 
is not one unified actor (e.g. Taylor 2009:178). Businessmen, the Communist 
Party of China (CPC), politicians from different African countries, civil society of 
many different African countries – they all play a role in Sino-African relations. 
Latest scholarly works have shifted the focus on e.g. African civil society (cf. 
Harneit-Sievers 2010), African agency (Mohan 2013) and African perceptions 
(Hanusch 2011). Other scholars concentrate on the implications Sino-African 
relations have for European countries, e.g. with regard to development 
cooperation. Hakenesch for example tries to shed light on European cooperation 
                                                          
2 A simmilar argument is also provided by Strange (2011). 
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with Ethiopia by comparing European and Chinese policies towards Ethiopia 
(Asche et al. 2008; Hakenesch 2013).  
My research project links to the more recent debates on Sino-African 
relations. On the one hand, I focus on African, more precisely Malawian, 
perspectives. On the other hand, I discuss in how far these insights allow for new 
approaches to current academic debates on development. This is a rather 
postcolonial approach to knowledge production which pleads for an equal 
dialogue between indigenous knowledge and “current science” (c.f. Bala et al. 
2007).  
 
2. Theoretical framework 
 
The theoretical framework aims at introducing current debates on development – 
mainly the partnership approach – and to critically examine them. One major 
criticism is that partnership is mainly seen as a means for aid-efficiency, whereas 
the building up of a partnership is not discussed. Normative aspects of re-
distribution and deliberation hardly play a role in reflections on partnership. 
Honneth’s theory of recognition argues that political recognition is highly relevant 
for achieving equitable, peaceful and sustainable relations. It therefore allows for 
an alternative perspective on donor-recipient relations and is introduced to provide 
a complementary way to the conventional understanding of partnership because 
his focus is on the process of building up equitable relations. 
 
2.1. What is development (assistance)? 
 
Development is a widespread concept with different meanings attached to it. For 
this reason, it is of great importance to clearly define what understanding is 
underlying this thesis. Although clearly demarcating the understanding from 
others, I use a rather broad understanding of development so that the discussion 
can relate to a variety of development debates. Jönsson et al. understand 
development as “a matter of re-shaping and improving people's living conditions, 
through economic, political and social processes” (Jönsson et al. 2012: 18). They 
emphasize the political aspect which to them mainly means to redistribute 
resources globally and among generations in order to create “greater welfare for 
the majority of mankind” (Jönsson et al. 2012: 18). Political processes, to them, 
can – not only but significantly – be shaped by the action of states. States have the 
capacity to impact in development by influencing political, economic and social 
processes (Jönsson et al. 2012:18-19). Based on Jönsson’s definition the scope for 
this thesis is to look at political means which are initiated at the state level and 
aim at creating “greater welfare for the majority of” Malawians which are initiated 
on the state level.  
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Official development assistance (ODA)  
Having a certain understanding of what development means, the matter of 
assistance is not yet covered. In order to link to other cases of donor-recipient 
relations, this thesis defines assistance according to the standard understanding of 
ODA. The development assistance committee (DAC) uses the following 
definition: Funding has to be concessional which means that at least 25% of a loan 
needs to be a grant with a 10% discount rate. Thus only grants and concessionary 
loans are ODA (Brautigam 2011b: 203-204).  
Modernization and dependency 
Development is, of course, not such a clearly definable matter as suggested by the 
definitions above. Scholars and practitioners disagree on which actors (states vs. 
civil society) or which content (welfare vs. human rights) to focus on (Elliot 
2008:40). Development debates take place on many different levels. On a 
theoretical level, two main approaches have for a long time demarcated the 
spectrum: modernization and dependency theory. Many of the current and past 
approaches can be classified as being close to either one of these two poles.  
Both theories focus on completely different issues: Modernization theories 
argue that a society’s industrialization and technologization lead to greater 
efficiency and therefore facilitate better living conditions for more people (Akude 
2011:73-74). The theory has been criticized for following a teleological 
understanding of world affairs as if every society needed to pass several stages for 
the purpose of becoming industrialized (Jönsson et al. 2010:44, Sokhey 2010). 
Modernization theory and arguments for a liberalization of global economy are 
closely related because of the implicit assumption that progress on an economic 
level leads to less underdevelopment.  
Dependency theories, in contrast, explain underdevelopment as a 
consequence of global political and economic processes which give rise to the 
exploitation of the global South (Conway 2008:95). As a consequence, scholars of 
that school do not assess global capitalism in the same manner as scholars of the 
modernization theory. Several proponents of dependency theory suggest a 
regionalization of economic systems so that developing countries can become 
independent of industrialized countries (Akude 2011:75-79). Both dependency 
and modernization theories have been criticized for their regional bias: 
modernization theories for being based on ethnocentric views of western 
industrialization; and dependency theories for deriving from experiences of Latin 
American countries during a specific period (cf. Sokhey 2010).  
These two major theories in development studies give a rough idea of the 
field and dominant approaches during the second half of the 20th century (Akude 
2011). They make clear that development theories are clearly normative in the 
way they are arguing about future prospects of global processes. They are all 
suggesting changes for the better and a certain improvement (Akude 2011: 69). 
Yet, they argue for different causes of underdevelopment and thus propose 
verious solutions.  
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Criticism on development: postdevelopment and postcolonial approaches 
The variety of approaches clearly shows that there is an enormous debate on what 
to change and in which way. Development as a concept can therefore be argued to 
be an “empty signifier that can be filled with almost any content” (Ziai 2009: 
183). This criticism of conceptual vagueness relates to the postdevelopment 
discourse which emerged during the 1980s. Scholars like e.g. Arturo Escobar have 
criticized the dichotomous understanding reflected in development discourse. To 
them, a discrepancy between developed and underdeveloped is constructed which 
in fact serves to maintain a dominance of western concepts on a political and a 
scientific level (Jönsson et al. 2012: 65). Postdevelopment scholars criticize that 
the idea of modernizing and improving the situation of the so called developing 
countries is inherent in any idea of development. To them, this modernization 
aspect does not take into account cultural heterogeneity on a global level (Ziai 
2009: 183). 
Postcolonial criticism follows a similar reasoning by “challeng[ing] the 
meaning of development as rooted in colonial discourse depicting the North as 
advanced and progressive and the South as backward, degenerate and primitive” 
(McEwan 2008: 125). Some scholars point out that fostering indigenous ways of 
societal organization may be of greater benefit than the integration of low-income 
countries into the global economy (McEwan 2008: 126) because it corresponds to 
local needs. Others refer to the process of identity construction by differentiating 
between “us” and “them” during the period of European colonialism which 
continues up to now (Loomba 2005). The dichotomy of developed vs. 
underdeveloped is one example for the notion of othering in development studies.   
However, postdevelopment and postcolonial approaches are not 
homogenous in their criticism. Some scholars take a very radical approach 
pleading for any activity in the development sector to be ended. One well-known 
example is Dambisa Moyo who takes a rather neoliberal approach. To her, 
international aid has slowed down and even hindered development in low-income 
countries. She refers for example to established dependency and corruption which 
are enhanced through aid (Moyo 2010). Other scholars are in favor of reforms of 
the development sector. They plead for a reorientation of development from a 
bottom-up perspective, e.g. involving grassroots movements more intensively. 
Based on the reform oriented criticism, a lot of changes have occurred in 
development debates and politics during the past ten to twenty years (cf. Ziai 
2009:184).  
Changes in the development landscape 
The theoretical debates mentioned above are partly reflected in practical 
approaches in development politics. Criticism from postdevelopment and 
postcolonial perspectives raises awareness of top-down practices and exclusion of 
local people and their knowledge in development assistance. Thus, more recent 
international agreements on development, namely the Millenium Development 
Goals, the Rome Declaration and the Paris Declaration (and follow-ups), can be 
argued to partly respond to this criticism (Ziai 2011:27). They mirror a shift in the 
field of development: on the level of content, social development became the 
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focus; on the level of political process the principles of partnership and ownership 
are widely accepted. 
The Millenium Development Goals (MDGs) derive from the Millenium 
Development Declaration of 2000. 147 head of states agreed to achieve the 
following eight goals up to 2015 (World Bank 2013a): to halve the proportion of 
people living in extreme poverty and hunger; grant primary school education for 
everyone; increase gender equality and empower women; reduce child mortality; 
improve maternal health; combat HIV/Aids and malaria, ensure environmental 
sustainability; establish a global partnership for development and trade (UN 
2013a). The MDGs mainly state contents of social development. Moreover they 
state the goal of creating a “global partnership for development” which mainly 
refers to trade and finance.  
Subsequently, the Paris Declaration in 2005 and the follow ups in Accra 
and Busan are concerned with ways of shaping donor-recipient relations in order 
to achieve aid-effectiveness. Five main principles are set up so as to realize aid-
effectiveness: ownership, harmonization, alignment, managing for results and 
mutual accountability (OECD 2005). The Paris Declaration establishes these 
principles as “partnership commitments” (OECD 2005:3). Especially the 
principles of ownership and alignment emphasize mutual responsibility: to 
“exercise” and “respect” leadership as well as to support “partner countries’ 
national development strategies, institutions and procedures” (OECD 2005:3). 
The consensus of these agreements is the idea that partnership fosters aid 
efficiency. 
As exemplified by the brief overview of the MDGs and Paris Declaration, 
the 1990s and 2000s brought a reorientation and reform of development policies. 
As outlined above, the principle of partnership reflects a current consensus in the 
field of development. Furthermore, a focus on social development occurred 
through the MDGs' focus on poverty, hunger, gender, education and health. 
Funding for this sector was increased; the share became 60% of the total donor 
funding (Brautigam 2011a:77). Social development can be realized on a 
community level by taking participatory approaches, thus working on 
implementing the idea of partnership on a community level (Ziai 2009:184). Yet, 
in the international agreements (MDGs and Paris Declaration), partnership mainly 
refers to the state level. It is frequently criticized that donor-recipient relations on 
a state-level do not correspond to the ideal of partnership as cooperation between 
equal counterparts. Barnes and Brown argue that partnership in a normative sense 
means establishing an equal relation. Only this allows for partner countries to 
bring in their own needs and suggestions of projects (Barnes and Brown 2011). 
Based on Barnes and Brown, the notion of partnership is dealt with in greater 
detail in the following passage.  
 
2.2. Partnership in development debates 
 
As pointed out above, partnership is highly relevant for current debates on 
development as well as international declarations. But what does the concept of 
11 
 
partnership mean in theory and in practice? 
This in-depth discussion originates from Barnes and Browns (2011) 
depiction of partnership within the MDGs. The two authors develop a framework 
as to how partnership can be understood in general and what specifically derives 
from goal 8 of the MDGs. In general, “partnership references the creation of an 
association of equal participants, with common interests, who agree to 
approximate a condition of equal burden, equal benefit, and the responsibilities 
and liabilities inherent in this joint venture” (Barnes – Brown 2011:174). By 
depicting the discourse on partnership from the 1990s onwards, the two authors 
point out that the term partnership has a dual meaning. On the one hand, it can be 
understood in an instrumental way: If recipients of aid are seen as partners, they 
are expected to take more responsibility for the development of their country. In 
this understanding, partnership is anticipated to create greater aid-efficiency 
(Barnes – Brown 2011: 172). There is a consensus among development 
researchers and practitioners about the instrumental value of partnership and 
ownership. Many argue that aid needs to be based on recipients’ ideas if it is to be 
effective. This instrumental aspect is also dominating development debates (cf 
Molenaers 2012:793). However, some recipients might fear that donors want to 
shuffle themselves out of responsibility by pleading for partnership and 
ownership. 
On the other hand, partnership clearly has a moral component which 
“allows the impression that partnership is about transforming power relations in a 
positive and socially just fashion” (Barnes – Brown 2011:172). In current debates 
on development, this moral component resonates with the term partnership; 
however, the dominant component is the instrumental one. In both 
understandings, however, partnership stays a normative undertaking – something 
that needs to be striven for (Barnes – Brown 2011:175). In order to answer the 
question of how to achieve the partnership goal, Barnes and Brown relate to 
political philosophy and normative criteria for partnership.  
Distributive justice and deliberative public reason are the two leading 
concepts Barnes and Brown discuss with regard to normative criteria for 
partnership (Barnes – Brown 2011:175). Concerning distributive justice, they 
point out that the “allocation of benefits and burdens of economic activity and of 
social institutions” needs to be agreed upon by both parties. Both parties need to 
establish a contractual agreement so that they can equally benefit and are liable 
(or otherwise agree to different conditions). Three targets of MDG 8 tackle this 
goal of greater distributive justice (Barnes – Brown 2011:175-176).  
The second normative criterion for partnership – deliberative public 
reason – touches upon the exercise of power in decision making processes. So as 
to implement a partnership approach, both parties need to have actual 
opportunities to influence the decisions. Moreover, they need to be able to call 
unequal use of power into question. Last, deliberation describes a process which is 
acceptable and legitimate to all participants (Barnes – Brown 2011:176). The two 
criteria deliberation and distribution reflect two poles of justice which will be 
discussed later on: recognition and redistribution or procedural and material 
aspects of development assistance. 
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To be able to further discuss the notion of partnership, it is necessary to 
differentiate between its moral and its instrumental component. Furthermore, the 
normative criteria deliberative decision making and distributive justice are the 
guiding principles for discussing the implementation of partnership. The 
underlying values of these two principles are equality, egality and mutual respect: 
both partners have a say and freely agree on decisions (Barnes – Brown 2011:172-
177). Therefore, by following Barnes’ and Brown’s propositions of normative 
criteria, the moral (power transforming) component of partnership is brought back 
in. Currently, the normative questions of what partnership should be like and how 
to build it up, are rather underrepresented in development debates (Barnes – 
Brown 2011:165). The Paris Declaration serves as a good example for this 
criticism. It assumes that a partnership is already there and states “Partnership 
Commitments” for creating aid efficiency (OECD 2005). The section below refers 
to criticism concerning the implementation of partnership. Is the partnership 
concept mere rhetoric covering up power imbalances? How then, can partnership 
foster aid efficiency? 
“The Paternalism of Partnership” (Eriksson Baaz 2005) 
Many scholars argue that the dichotomous thinking criticized by postdevelopment 
scholars is still taking place; therefore it is hypocritical to speak of a partnership 
between donors and receiving countries. Lepenies e.g. heavily criticizes 
statements by the head of the UN Millenium Project advisory body, Jeffrey Sachs. 
To Lepenies (2009), Sachs' attitude towards development reflects a dichotomous 
separation of the world into developed and underdeveloped. By arguing that a 
technology transfer to underdeveloped countries was the solution to fight 
underdevelopment, Sachs reproduces an understanding of development which is 
not based on partnership. According to Lepenies it rather reflects the established 
attitude that western donors know what is good for receiving countries (Lepenies 
2009:40-41). 
Eriksson Baaz (2005) argues in a similar manner. She points out that 
partnership is the dominating discourse in development studies and practice. 
However, this does not imply that relations between recipients and donors have 
become more equal. In her book “The Paternalism of Partnership”, Eriksson Baaz 
analyzes discourses of development workers and observes a continuing self-
conception of donors as superior: “[d]onor and development worker identification 
involves a positioning of the Self as developed and superior in contrast to a 
backward and inferior other” (Eriksson Baaz 2005:167). 
There is an inherent power discrepancy in development assistance. One 
obvious reason for this inequality is the access to economic resources (Jönsson et 
al 2012). Development assistance is to a large degree characterized by one party 
supporting another one financially or materially. So by nature, the receiving party 
is less influential within the relationship than the donating party. This is even 
more so because many donors tie grants and budget support to political or 
economic conditions (Brautigam 2011a: 148-151, 285-286). Even the 
establishment of development partnerships can usually only take place if 
recipients share the donors’ objectives (Eriksson Baaz 2005:74). 
Since the normative aspect of partnership is hardly touched upon in 
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development debates the concept can be argued to be an empty signifier (c.f. Ziai 
2011). The partnership rhetoric, however, is widely spread. For instance, the terms 
donor and recipient are oftentimes replaced by the word ‘partners’. Existing 
power imbalances among donors and recipients are widely disregarded by 
mainstream approaches (Eriksson Baaz 2005:74). Since partnership is usually 
understood on an instrumental level and normative aspects hardly play a role in 
development debates, there is a risk that partnership rhetoric covers up existing 
power imbalances and therefore hinders the transformation. So the normative 
aspect of partnership needs to be brought back into debates for two reasons: First, 
if partnership is believed to be an important means for aid efficiency, knowing 
how to achieve partnership provides the basis for partnership as an instrument for 
aid-efficiency. Second, the normative discussion of partnership avoids the risk to 
cover up existing power imbalances and thus allows for a transformation. 
The concept of recognition provides an analytical lens to discuss 
normative aspects of social relations. It will be presented in the sections below in 
order to discuss in how far this approach may be a useful extension of or 
complementary to the partnership approach. 
 
2.3. Recognition in social science 
 
Humiliation3 and Recognition are two sides of the same coin. Both concepts have 
been discussed in detail with regard to interpersonal relations, yet with regard to 
international relations (IR) the debate is not too advanced. Of course, legal 
recognition of a state by the international community has played a major role in 
IR debates for many years. Some scholars of IR have recently begun to criticize 
this focus on legal matters because “it only scratches the surface of the 
recognition phenomenon and particularly a political actor’s quest for self-esteem” 
(Lindemann 2013:151). So there seems to be a turn in IR theory with regard to 
debates on recognition; leading to the inclusion of political and social-
psychological aspects of recognition. 
A related concept to questions of political recognition is the notion of 
identity. Identity has played a role in certain IR theories with regard to e.g. 
conflicts involving nationalism or religious convictions (Gross-Stein 2009). In 
development studies, issues of humiliation play an important role when reflecting 
on the colonial roots of development assistance (Doty 1996). Yet, debates about 
identity formation and the concept of identity focus more on internal processes of 
a group. The concept of recognition allows for a more dynamic perspective 
focusing on the process of interaction; for recognition involves at least two actors: 
one who recognizes and one who is recognized.  
For the purpose of demarcating the basic idea of recognition, it is 
necessary to draw on rather social-psychological and philosophic concepts which 
constitute the base for discussions in IR. In the mid-1990s, both Honneth and 
                                                          
3 In this thesis humiliation is understood as taking place if the population of a state feels degraded 
concerning the collective self-esteem. This degradation spreads as collective narratives about 
misrecognition, lacking recognition or even actions of abasement. (Honneth 2010: 195-197.) 
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Taylor discuss the matter of recognition (Taylor 1994, Honneth 1994). They 
mainly focus on processes in societal life of formally acknowledging and 
positively approving various groups of society.4 Taylor's approach rests focused 
on inner-societal processes of recognition. Honneth in contrast moves on and 
includes a discussion of recognition in IR in his recent publication (Honneth 
2010). For this reason, Honneth's concept of recognition is the basis of the 
theoretical framework of this thesis. 
2.3.1. Honneth’s early theory 
Honneth's theory of recognition can be understood as a “social theory with 
'normative intent'” (Haacke 2005:186). He underlines this status by claiming “it is 
not an ethic of recognition” (Honneth in Marcelo 2013) meaning that motivation 
for and foundation of recognition are not the focus of discussion but rather its 
social meaning, its base in communication theory and implementation. 
The most prominent publication by Honneth, “the struggle for recognition” 
(1994), tries to systematize the notion of recognition. He starts off by tracing back 
Hegel's line of argumentation and then develops a systematic overview of how to 
understand recognition. According to Honneth, Hegel develops a concept on the 
emergence of personal self-consciousness and independence vis à vis other human 
beings. Due to the encounter with other human beings a person has to neglect 
certain personal desires  thereby expressing recognition towards the other person 
(Honneth 2010:7-32). Honneth uses this concept of recognition in order to 
develop a concept of social justice which goes beyond materialist understandings 
of justice. 
“Emotional affection”, “cognitive respect” and “social esteem” are three 
different forms of recognition Honneth elaborates on. While “emotional affection” 
refers to close relationships amongst family and friends, the category of 
“cognitive respect” refers to legal aspects of accepting a person and granting 
certain rights (Honneth 1994:179, 211). The third category of “social esteem” is 
about the appreciation humans experience within society because of their 
achievements and features (Honneth 1994:183). This form of recognition derives 
from the cultural self-conception of a society, meaning that cultural values of what 
deserves recognition decide on the level of recognition a respective person 
experiences (Honneth 1994:198). 
Based on the different forms of recognition, Honneth develops 
corresponding categories of disdain: physical maltreatment, personal disregard 
(structural exclusion) and vilification of individual and collective ways of life 
(Honneth 1994:214-217). Disdain thus plays out differently and also affects 
individuals or social groups in different ways. It can diminish physical or social 
integrity but also affect the honor or dignity of an individual or a group (Honneth 
1994:211). These experiences of disdain can therefore evoke different reactions 
                                                          
4
Taylor (1994) focuses on the aspect of multiculturalism, mainly on the difficulty of neither 
homogenizing nor relativizing difference. He suggests attributing a possibility of finding sth. 
worth admiring in each person a priori. In his work it becomes clear that recognition cannot solely 
be based on achievements because certain external factors can harm the development of socially 
appreciated achievements. 
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and provoke conflict or resistance which aims at achieving recognition (Honneth 
1994:256). 
2.3.2. Honneth’s theory of recognition and IR 
Some scholars of IR take on these reflections about interpersonal recognition and 
discuss their relevance for interstate recognition and respect (Haacke 2005, Wolf 
2008). They question how to understand recognition and how to make use of the 
concept in IR. Honneth draws on these inputs and includes a whole chapter 
questioning the extent to which interstate relations can be explained by striving 
for self-assertion as it often happens in IR. He argues that states are not only 
striving for self-assertion but also for recognition (Honneth 2010:181-201). 
What does recognition mean in the context of international relations? 
When elaborating on interstate recognition, Honneth points out how important it 
is to be aware of the terminology which derives from psychological approaches to 
interpersonal recognition. When theorizing the recognition among states, the same 
terminology is used, yet it refers to a rather philosophical level of interstate 
relations (Honneth 2010:184). It is thus very important to not confuse the different 
levels of the theory of recognition. To Honneth, the main difference lies in the role 
of state actors. They work on the implementation of political responsibilities but 
do not possess attitudes, feelings and needs as individual actors (Honneth 
2010:186). Yet, the concept of interpersonal recognition can be transferred to 
interstate recognition because any person who identifies with a respective state 
will feel recognized or humiliated in a similar way as the state (Wolf 2008:14). 
In the same manner as he addresses interpersonal relations, Honneth 
differentiates between various forms of recognition when it comes to IR: legal and 
political, diplomatic recognition. Regarding the first aspect, Honneth refers to 
international law and the formal process of a state being accepted in the 
international community of states by other states. To him, this process only means 
to be aware of the existence of a state. The second – more fundamental – form, 
however describes the actual process of recognizing. In order to be able to 
recognize another state, there has to be a tolerance/ range for decision-making. 
Political recognition takes place if a government takes the free decision to 
cooperate with another state in a positive way. This sort of recognition is 
approached by Honneth in a normative way. He points out that political 
recognition can be used to improve state relations (Honneth 2010:187-188). 
Honneth further substantiates the notion of recognition by starting from the 
legitimation of foreign politics. In a very detailed manner he describes how the 
population of a state develops certain collective expectations with regard to 
foreign policy decisions. While working on rather functional tasks, political actors 
are expected to represent the country in a way which evokes international 
recognition (Honneth 2010:187-189). 
Honneth presents different ways of how recognition can play out in 
interstate relations. First and foremost, he explains the importance of symbolic 
manifestations, e.g. the implementation of metaphors, historic rituals, mimic and 
gestures. These symbolic acts express respect for achievements of the country and 
awareness of the collective identity of the population (Honneth 2010:190). 
However, he does not give any practical examples for this category of symbolic 
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recognition. A second way of recognition playing out is the direct and outspoken 
recognition of achievements in a country by the head of state of another country. 
Honneth exemplifies this way by referring to Obama's speech in Kairo in 2009 
when he explicitly valued cultural achievements of Islam (Honneth 2010: 190). 
Third, Honneth elaborates upon the notion of claiming for international 
recognition. This however, hardly ever occurs because government representatives 
aim for national independence; yet, publicly claiming for international recognition 
would express dependence and weakness (Honneth 2010:191). 
When it comes to understanding and theorizing international relations, 
Honneth points out how important it is to not only consider the goal of wealth, 
welfare and self-assertion; but also to take into account how government actors 
strive for their country being internationally recognized. This is driven by public 
expectations for the leaders to take the collective identity into consideration 
(Honneth 2010: 192). Honneth emphasizes the impact of such expectations of 
international recognition within a certain population which shape foreign politics 
of that country. Every state depends on the appreciation of its population which 
can be achieved by taking the collective identity seriously (Honneth 2010:192-
193). On the one hand, state leaders are expected to achieve an established and 
respected position within the international community, and on the other hand to 
work on historical experiences of humiliation or injustice. Honneth uses the 
picture of a scale to show how both negative and positive expectations can be the 
driving force for foreign politics. For the negative side, he exemplifies humiliation 
by referring to Germany during the Nazi regime. The Nazis made use of the 
experience of humiliation through the treaty of Versailles which was present in the 
public opinion of the population. For reasons of taking revenge the leaders were 
legitimized in the public opinion to act in an aggressive way concerning foreign 
politics. Honneth also gives a positive example by referring to the United States of 
America. To him, there has been a clear attempt by Obama to reconcile with the 
international community, because of a “widespread feeling of embarrassing 
isolation within the population”5 (Honneth 2010:193). While his example of Nazi-
Germany is based on evidence, Honneth does not give proof for the positive 
example of the US. His argument on the negative side is therefore stronger. 
However, Honneth himself points out how difficult it is to specify the “we” of the 
population. He calls it a hypothetical, not an empirical variable which is based on 
random and assumed expectations forming collective narratives. These narratives 
serve as the legitimation for actions in foreign politics. It is even possible for a 
state to influence the foreign policies of other countries by influencing the 
population's narratives (Honneth 2010:194-199). 
Honneth sums up his essay on recognition in IR by referring to various 
conflicts (e.g. Israeli-Palestinian, former Yugoslavia, German- Polish). He points 
out that recognition can be used as a means to deconstruct governmentally used 
narratives of humiliation and thus create peace. The former German chancellor 
Brandt, who fell on his knees in front of the Polish government, serves as clear 
illustration of this reconciling power of recognition.  He makes clear that peaceful 
cooperation between countries is only possible if it signalizes to the local 
                                                          
5Translated from German by myself. 
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population that they are part of a global community of people. Thereby it is 
possible to create trust among populations of different countries. On this basis, 
more peaceful expectations of foreign politics arise (Honneth 2010: 199-201). 
With regard to conflicts, Honneth's argument is very strong. IR goes 
beyond conflicts; yet humiliation and recognition still play a role. Wolf (2008) and 
Haacke (2005) shed light on a broader utilization of the theory of recognition6. 
Haacke for example refers to a number of IR studies on different topics which 
already include recognition as an explaining factor: works on nationalism, identity 
formation or international political economy (Haacke 2005:191-192). However, 
recognition as an overarching concept allows becoming aware of more aspects 
and thus to develop a more differentiated understanding. Wolf explicitly refers to 
the field of development studies. Development cooperation in general is striving 
for equality in terms of possession and rights. Therefore the field of development 
cooperation especially evokes expectations of recognition, while taking place in 
an environment of asymmetric interdependency. Development cooperation and 
politics is thus an important field of IR for applying the theory of recognition 
(Wolf 2008:36). 
Wolf points out that Honneth mainly focuses on the recognition of rights, 
achievements and features. According to Wolf, this understanding is too narrow: 
Actors (including states) also strive for being respected as independent actors 
without delivering proof for achievements (Wolf 2008:10). For this reason Wolf 
uses the term respect rather than recognition.  Yet, respect should not be equated 
with approval – not paying attention to an actor can be more harmful than 
criticizing him or her. Any actor wants to be taken seriously (Wolf 2008:11). 
Furthermore, Wolf underlines that taking an actor seriously means to take his/her 
need seriously (Wolf 2008:17) . Although one can argue that Wolf's understanding 
of respect is included in Honneth's category of formal recognition/cognitive 
respect, Wolf's criticism widens the analytical perspective not to dismiss a state’s 
striving for being appreciated as independent actor. 
Wolf raises another problem concerning the ontology of 
respect/recognition in IR. He points out that respect/recognition might not be seen 
as an independent driving factor because it has also an instrumental nature. So 
striving for respect can be connected to material goals. This criticism also applies 
to empirically capturing recognition. How can recognition be demarcated from 
other interests of states if they are oftentimes interconnected (Wolf 2008:18-19)? 
On the one hand, Wolf himself mentions that striving for e.g. material interests 
frequently results from the longing for recognition (Wolf 2008:19). On the other 
hand, Wolf refers to the importance of intrastate discourses (Wolf 2008:16). So in 
order to find out about the relation of material interests and interests of 
recognition, it is reasonable to analyze discourses. But before working on the 
methodology by introducing an analytical framework, the following section deals 
with the critical issue of recognition and power imbalances. 
 
                                                          
6 Wolf, however, uses the term “respect” which will be explained later on. 
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2.4. Recognition and power imbalances 
 
As mentioned above, the concept of recognition traces back to Hegel. His account 
of recognition uses the master slave relationship so as to illustrate how persons 
struggle for recognition in their respective role. The core of his reflections on 
recognition is the discussion of a person’s autonomy and independence while 
emphasizing the social role. To him, independence can only be established if one 
is recognized by others (Markell 2009)7. 
Since Hegel uses the master-slave-relationship to discuss recognition, the 
question is obvious whether or not recognition might lead to the reproduction of 
hierarchies and power imbalances. Several scholars draw attention to the risk of 
reinforcing social structures of injustice because the practice of recognition 
confirms certain roles. Nancy Fraser for example raises the dilemma of “identity‐
based injustice and the problem of economic injustice” which risk a trade-off in 
debates on (in)justice (Markell 2009). Honneth also elaborates on this point in 
reaction to Louis Althusser. The latter sees the institutional practice of recognition 
as a mechanism to build up subjects who are in conformity with the system, thus 
reinforcing power structures (Honneth 2010:104). Hence, the issue at stake is a 
tension between material aspects of justice (redistribution) and procedural aspects 
of justice in social relations (recognition). Does recognition and identity-based 
justice lead to a reinforcement of material injustice? 
Honneth understands himself as a scholar of critical social theory. 
Therefore, he takes Althusser’s criticism seriously. Yet, he adheres to the 
importance of recognition. To him, the point of origin is humiliation or 
misrecognition of a person which restricts her/his independence and personal 
autonomy (Honneth 2010:105). Furthermore, he stresses the practical aspect of 
recognition: mere symbolic expressions of recognition are not credible if they do 
not include corresponding behavior (Honneth 2010:110).  
The two main points of criticism I have pointed out are: the risk to 
underemphasize material injustice by focusing on identity related matters and the 
problem of reinforcing or reproducing social inequalities by affirmative 
recognition. However, the criticism by Fraser and Althusser refers to inner-state 
relations. So how should one react to these problems on the level of interstate 
relations? In his reflections on recognition in IR, Honneth does not refer to the 
criticism. Yet, both points are applicable to the level of IR as shown by Eriksson 
Baaz. She e.g. mentions critics of hers who argue that the emphasis on identity is 
irrelevant if basic needs have not been fulfilled (Eriksson Baaz 2005:10). It is not 
possible to solve this problem at this point. However, it is important to bear that in 
mind and include it in the analytical framework so as to find out whether or not it 
applies to the case.  
  
                                                          
7 This means that a focus on identity-based injustice, might mean that less attention is paid to 
material injustice. 
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2.5. Synthesis: definition and analytical framework 
 
To sum up the theoretical discussion of recognition, there are certain key concepts 
which should play a role in an empirical analysis of donor-recipient-relations. 
First of all, based on Honneth, recognition is understood as a possible guiding 
principle for interstate interaction which, if being applied, allows for processes of 
reconciliation and building trust. It is important to differentiate between legal and 
political recognition, to be precise about the range of the respective aspect of 
recognition. Second, if talking about political recognition, there are subgroups to 
be considered: Is it about the recognition of achievements and features, or about 
being respected as an independent actor? If it is about achievements or features – 
where does the frame of reference come from in an international context? Does 
public opinion provide narratives about experiences of humiliation which cause 
certain decisions in foreign policy making? Which sort of humiliation is involved: 
structural exclusion or vilification of individual and collective ways of life? 
Which discourses and discursive practices provide some insight into the 
interconnection between striving for materialist goals versus recognition?8 
In contrast to an instrumental understanding of partnership, the theory of 
recognition emphasizes the question of how to achieve desirable interstate 
relations including symbolic aspects of building up equitable interstate relations. 
The focus is put on building trust and establishing cooperative relations. As 
mentioned above, on the interpersonal level Honneth argues that genuine 
recognition implies actions and thus takes material injustice into account. This 
undertaking of considering material and non-material (symbolic, procedural, 
identity-based) aspects of building up equitable interstate relations is very relevant 
with regard to development debates. The question of how to achieve an equal 
partnership is hardly tackled in that way. By analyzing how recognition plays out 
in development cooperation between the PRC and Malawi, the following question 
will be discussed: in how far are symbolic, procedural and identity-based aspects 
as well as legal and material aspects relevant for donor-recipient relations? 
 
3. Theory of science 
 
The theoretical framework for this thesis is based on two debates: recognition as a 
factor in IR and the partnership approach in development studies.  One component 
of the concept of partnership –  Barnes and Browns argue – “is about transforming 
power relations in a positive and socially just fashion” (Barnes – Browns:172). 
The same intention underlies Honneth’s theory of recognition which emphasizes 
the force of recognition to foster reconciliation and to empower actors to greater 
autonomy (Honneth 2010:201, 111). Thus, the two debates framing this thesis 
                                                          
8 Table 1a in the appendix shows an overview of the different discourses and questions according 
to the sections they will be discussed in. 
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underline the transformative aspect of social sciences. So the underlying 
understanding of social science in this thesis belongs to critical approaches to 
social science.  
This positioning as critical approach is also reflected in the 
epistemological and ontological assumptions of this thesis. Following Jackson’s 
(2011) distinction of epistemological and ontological understandings within IR, 
this thesis belongs to critical realist approaches to social science. Jackson points 
out that critical realists presuppose that there is a reality which is mind-
independent but still goes beyond what “our perceptual and technologically 
augmented detections would suggest” (Jackson 2011:104): there are unobservable 
factors which have an influence on social and political processes. Not only 
material factors play a role when explaining IR but also matters of identity and 
symbolic interaction (Jackson 2011:73). The most important unobservable factors 
discussed in this thesis are recognition and humiliation. Recognition and 
humiliation are understood as explanatory and transformative factors for interstate 
relations, so that this thesis can be labeled as having a “transfactual” 
understanding of observed phenomena (Jackson 2011:37). With regard to this 
thesis, it means that the donor-recipient relations are not only explained by 
material factors but also by using recognition as an explanatory factor. 
Norman Fairclough's approach of critical discourse analysis (CDA) shares 
similar ontological and epistemological assumptions: there is a social reality 
which social scientists try to make sense of, yet this reality is also produced and 
reproduced by discourses. To him, it is possible to understand as well as transform 
social reality by analyzing the relation of discourses to other aspects of social 
practices (e.g. material, values, etc.) (Chouliaraki – Fairclough 1999:4,16). Since 
Honneth also refers to narratives with regard to recognition and humiliation, CDA 
is a theoretically and methodologically justified way to approach donor-recipient 
relations of China and Malawi. For this reason, CDA was chosen to provide the 
methodological framework of this thesis.  
 
4. Method 
 
Discourse analysis, especially CDA, has been argued to be the best possible 
choice in order to find out about recognition in donor-recipient relations. 
Nevertheless, it is not yet clear what should be the material for CDA and how to 
proceed.
9
 Analyzing political recognition means to analyze how a respective 
population creates meaning regarding interstate relations. Based on Clifford 
Geertz, one can say that context related factors as societal expressions and 
symbols therefore play a major role in this undertaking (Simonis 2008). In order 
to understand the discourses, the context needs to be considered. Hence, to do 
                                                          
9 In order to develop a methodological framework, it would be useful to take other empirical 
studies of recognition in IR or in development studies into account. As already mentioned, political 
recognition has only very recently become popular within IR so that no such study provides the 
basis for this thesis. Eriksson Baaz’ (2005) work on identity matters in development assistance is 
one of the few works giving some guidance on that matter. 
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justice to the relevance of context, this thesis performs an in-depth one-case study. 
So particular aspects, how recognition impacts on donor-recipient relations are 
most likely specific to the case of Malawi. Nevertheless, Malawi can be argued to 
be representative of developing countries in general. If recognition matters in 
donor-recipient-relations in Malawi, it will most likely matter in other developing 
countries, too. Yet, the particular outcome might differ.  
Case selection 
The selection of Malawi as a case is based on quantitative and qualitative criteria. 
On the quantitative level, the choice is based on factors which indicate that 
Malawi belongs to the group of so called developing countries. The main 
indicators are low income and low GDP (World Bank 2013b) which imply a need 
for economic development. Moreover, the Human Development Index gives a 
summary of shortages including social aspects. In 2012, Malawi was ranked 170 
out of 187 countries (UNDP 2013). Hence, there are economic as well as social 
reasons to choose Malawi as a case. Yet, why to choose Malawi and not another 
developing country? At this point, qualitative criteria come in. Sino-Malawian 
cooperation has started very recently in 2008. There is hardly any research done 
which focuses on this cooperation. So in order to fill this gap, I decided to 
research the Malawian case. Furthermore, the five main projects decided upon in 
the initial package deal qualify as ODA (cf. Brautigam 2011b: 203-204). All of 
them are – except for the stadium – finished by now. Thus, after five years of 
cooperation, this point in time provides a good starting point for the purpose of 
fieldwork on Malawian assessments of the five main projects and the cooperation 
in general.  
 
4.1. Data collection: semi-structured expert interviews 
 
As there has hardly been any scientific research on Malawian relations to China, 
this thesis contains an explorative element (Streb 2009). The main focus, however, 
is theory-driven: to analyze donor-recipient relations from a perspective of the 
theory of recognition.  
Concerning the theory-driven aspect of the research, the theory of 
recognition itself suggests focusing on discourses. Yet, the question of material 
still remains. In order for the discourse analysis to answer the research question, 
the material has to fulfill certain criteria. First, it has to allow for informed 
insights into development processes in Malawi. Second, it must deal with the case 
of Sino-Malawian cooperation. Third, the data needs to provide insights into 
Malawian understandings of recognition; so the data should reflect Malawian 
perspectives. These three aspects can hardly be found in written documents: 
newspaper articles might talk about Sino-Malawian relations but only marginally 
cover the aspect of development; documents of Malawian NGOs can provide 
insights into Malawian development processes yet not explicitly refer to Sino-
Malawian cooperation. Therefore, interviews are the best possible source of 
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information to combine all three aspects.10 
The selection of interviewees follows qualitative criteria (Flick 2007:154-
155). So as to get insights from persons who are informed about development 
matters as well as Sino-Malawian relations, I focus on experts in both sectors: 
Malawian civil servants who work in ministries related to the cooperation or 
development matters and representatives of Malawian development NGOs. This 
selection is based on the idea that both groups have detailed insights and 
knowledge in processes of development and political processes in the country. 
Their expertise provides a good basis for collecting data to discuss the theoretical 
problem of recognition and donor-recipient relations by relating it to the specific 
case of Chinese infrastructure projects (cf. Flick 2007:216-218). Moreover, the 
interviewees can be argued to reflect more general insights than their personal 
views because of their expert positions at the interface of government and 
population. Hence, discourses occurring in their statements are likely to reflect a 
broader group of Malawians.11 
The term “expert” is of course controversial. Especially in the field of 
development it can be argued that there cannot be an “expert” if the goal of 
development is to create “greater welfare for the majority of mankind” (Jönsson et 
al. 2012:18). Wouldn’t it make sense to rather interview a broad selection of 
people from different backgrounds? How can experts or elites know about the 
welfare of e.g. marginalized parts of society? Even though there is a valid point in 
this criticism, I decided to conduct expert-interviews. The interviewees represent a 
broad range of different entry points to the field of development: some are 
working on the governmental level, others in the non-governmental sector; some 
work on rather community related matters, others on economic development or on 
human rights issues. Hence, the interviewees have broad and comprehensive 
insights into the field. To a certain degree they know positions of marginalized 
people (e.g. int. 20 who is working on slum-upgrading) and at the same time they 
have insights into the political situation of the country. Therefore they are most 
likely able to evaluate development matters in a quite differentiated matter. 
The overall aim of the interviews is to shed light on aspects of recognition 
in Sino-Malawian cooperation. Interviews help to establish the interviewees' 
assessments of the Chinese infrastructure projects with regard to Malawi's 
development and the donor-recipient relation. In general, they provide insights 
into particular aspects of recognition. However, they might be biased if 
participants are asked directly. Against this backdrop, interviewees first have to be 
asked general questions about the projects. Based on these general insights, one 
can go on to ask in a direct manner. Semi-standardized interviews are the most 
reasonable way to gather this sort of data. They allow for open interview-
                                                          
10 Discourses on recognition are, of course, also reflected in public media. So in order to complete 
the discourse analysis, it could have been useful to also consider Malawian media coverage of the 
topic. The scope of the thesis, however does not allow for such an extensive analysis. For being 
able to answer the research question, the connection between development and recognition plays 
an important role. Therefore, I decided to focus on experts in the development sector. 
11 In the following text, the interviewees are denoted by numbers. So “int. 20” means interviewee 
number 20.  In appendix 2 you can find a list of all interviewees and their working positions which 
also indicates the place and date the interview took place. 
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questions to get an understanding of the interviewees’ overall assessments. 
Moreover, closed questions are also possible to elicit theory-driven insights. At 
the same time, the interviewer does not have to ask every single question in case 
the interviewee mentioned the answer already (Flick 2007:194-221). The 
underlying idea of semi-structured interviews is that a better understanding of the 
interviewees’ position is possible if the interview is rather conversational instead 
of sticking to a strict number and order of questions. Yet, certain important aspects 
need to be covered so that the data can be compared (Mikkelsen 2009:169). With 
regard to my fieldwork, I start off by posing open questions and become more 
specific towards the end (See appendix no. 7). Thereby I try to avoid two 
problems which can occur in the process of interviewing: not to influence the 
interviewee by initially asking too specific questions but still to gain specific 
insights I need for my research goal. 
It is difficult to operationalize the concept of recognition. There are only a 
few indicators which can deliver information about the interviewees’ assessment 
of recognition within the field of development (cf. Mikkelsen 2009:164). By 
starting off asking open questions about the participants' evaluation of the 
projects, I obtain knowledge about their context and overall assessments which 
help to interpret answers corresponding to leading questions (Kvaale – Brinkmann 
2009:171). By posing questions about partnership, visibility and symbolism, I aim 
directly at issues of recognition.12 However, these questions risk to be leading the 
interviewee in terms of which aspects to emphasize. One clear example is the 
question “The projects bring a visible change to the landscape of Malawi 
(Lilongwe especially). How do you evaluate this visibility?” By asking about 
visible changes, I risk to guide the interviewees. Yet, the interviewees answered in 
very different ways (interpreting visibility in various ways). Furthermore their 
previous answers help to evaluate how important they weigh the issue of visible 
changes. Many actually mention visibility by themselves before explicitly being 
asked about it. 
The reflections above deal with the quality of the attained data. By 
choosing a conversational approach and conducting semi-structured interviews, I 
aim at attaining information about the case, the interviewees' evaluation of the 
case and the context of the interviewee. On that basis, I obtain insights on aspects 
of recognition in development discourses in Malawi. 
My role as a researcher and ethical concerns of interviewing 
So far, only data-related criticism on interviews has been discussed. Nevertheless, 
there are also ethical concerns. In general, development research has to reflect 
upon unequal power relations which are inherent in the field itself: The normative 
dimension of development research has already been mentioned – to study low 
income countries as a researcher from a high income country necessarily implies a 
differentiation between “us here and them there” (Mikkelsen 2009:326). The 
dominance of western science in development studies is a factor reinforcing 
power relations (Mikkelsen 2009:326). As a German student at Lund University, I 
am part of the dominant group within the field. Whilst conducting research in the 
                                                          
12 An overview on the guiding questions can be found in the appendix (no. 8). 
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field and analyzing the findings, I have to pay attention to this imbalance in 
power. It can for example be argued that interviewees do not answer in a free way 
because they feel restricted by power imbalances. In my case, however, the fact 
that I interviewed elites and experts helps to partly circumvent this problem 
(Kvale – Brinkmann 2009:147) because their institutional power is a lot greater 
than mine as a student. Furthermore, I attempt to create a comfortable interview 
situation by visiting the interviewees at their workplace and by communicating in 
a friendly manner. Overall, the interviewees’ answers reflect quite diverging and 
even critical positions. I would therefore argue that the imbalance in power does 
not come severely into effect.  
Another important aspect to reflect upon is the process of getting access to 
interviewees. For the purpose of not being one-sided, I use different entry points 
into the field. Therefore, I make use of different channels for accessing 
interviewees: the German Agency for International Cooperation (GIZ), the 
Norwegian embassy, private contacts to an NGO and a lawyer, internet research 
and an e-mail-list for ex-patriots living in Lilongwe. Then I asked every 
interviewee for help to find other possible participants according to the snowball-
system (Rathbun 2009) 
Further ethical concerns relate to the privacy of the interviewees and their 
personal interests (Kvale – Brinkmann 2009:174-175). In order to not abuse the 
participants’ information, I offered to send them the statements included in the 
thesis by email so that they could check if they agreed with the way I understood 
and represent their answers. Most of them agreed; others were fine by being 
quoted without a second consent. Furthermore I do not include the interviewees' 
names in my thesis: their working position and type of organization provide 
sufficient information to contextualize their insights. 
 
4.2. Data analysis: critical discourse analysis 
 
As mentioned above, Honneth’s theory suggests considering narratives of 
humiliation which influence the foreign policies of a country (Honneth 2010:194-
199). Honneth thus suggests focusing on collective ways of understanding and 
interpreting so as to shed light on recognition, respectively humiliation. In 
general, discourse analysis likewise aims for uncovering ways in which meaning 
is attributed. Hence, a discourse analysis is a very useful way to locate the role of 
recognition in donor-recipient relations as perceived by Malawians. 
Discourses can be understood epistemologically as “abstract entities 
established on the basis of repetition and recurrence over time and in diverse 
social sites” and “ontologically they appear in the concrete form of particular 
texts” (Fairclough 2009:324). These “abstract entities” are based on a common 
understanding and a shared ascription of meaning to certain phenomena 
(Jorgenson – Phillips 2002:10-12). A major focus of discourse analysis is 
language as instrument to ascribe meaning. Discourse analysts assume that “our 
access to reality is always through language” (Jorgenson – Phillips 2002:8). Yet, 
meaning is not only ascribed by language, but also by other “semiotic elements”, 
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e.g. nonverbal communication and images (Chouliaraki – Fairclough 1999:38). 
Hence, discourse analysis aims at finding out how meaning is ascribed and which 
understandings are most common and dominating. 
Even though all discourse analysts agree that language is a key to 
accessing social phenomena, the role of language is debated. There are radical 
constructivist approaches as well as critical ones. CDA does not consider language 
to be the only social practice constructing reality. Other factors are also 
understood to be relevant, e.g. material factors or values (Chouliaraki – 
Fairclough 1999:6). However, language and other semiotic processes allow for 
accessing and framing these factors. According to Fairclough, it is important to 
analyze the “relations between semiotic and other social elements” (Fairclough 
2010:231). Not language itself is central but rather the “linguistic character of 
social and cultural processes and structures” (Meyer et al. 2007:146). Concerning 
the “critical” aspect of CDA, the scholars agree that it should address social 
problems (Fairclough 2010:235; Meyer et al. 2007:146).  
The starting point for this thesis – unequal donor-recipient relations – fits 
to this agenda of dealing with social problems. As discussed in the previous 
section, this problem clearly corresponds to economic structures. So in the context 
of discussing development, a critical approach to discourses is reasonable; for the 
whole concept of development is dealing with social phenomena beyond the 
ascription of meaning, as e.g. material injustice. 
The above gives an overview of discourses in general and the agenda of 
CDA. The question of how to conduct the analysis is not yet answered. Fairclough 
himself suggests two intertwining approaches for critical discourse analysis: He 
emphasizes that the analysis should follow three steps; namely to start by closely 
analyzing textual features, then putting them into context with other discursive 
practices and finally consider sociocultural practices (cf. Meyer et al. 2007:152; 
Fairclough 2010:238). Moreover, he outlines a broader framework of how to 
address a social problem making the social problem the starting point. This 
framework focusses on eliciting obstacles and solutions in order to overcome this 
social problem (Fairclough 2010:235-243; Chouliaraki – Fairclough 1999:65).  
The analysis of the interview material adopts  Fairclough’s and Meyer et 
al’s approach in a modified way. Fairclough states that theory and method cannot 
clearly be distinguished in CDA (Fairclough 2010: 234). As this statement 
suggests, it is difficult to derive clear instructions on how to conduct CDA. The 
methodological framework thus has to be be guided by the research interest. For 
this paper, it means to use aspects of CDA to help uncover the role of recognition 
in donor-recipient relations as perceived by Malawians.  
How to proceed 
Based on the above, the following paragraphs introduce the methodological 
proceeding for the analysis. First of all, it is important to identify the relevant 
discourses within the interview material. This means to find out current issues at 
stake or a general understanding of social processes and social coexistence. 
According to Honneth (2010:195) narratives are based on a hypothetical, 
not an empirical “we” of the population. He furthermore draws attention to the 
ethnic and cultural diversity within a state (Honneth 2010:185). So it is not 
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possible to speak of only one collective identity and one single narrative. Hence, 
when conducting discourse analysis, it is necessary to pay attention to dominating 
discourses as well as sub- and counter-discourses. There are different ways to 
make sense of one topic. Within one thematic discourse there is usually one 
dominant discourse which affects the whole field. Moreover, there can be one or 
more sub-discourses which do not correspond to the dominant one but provide 
alternative or contradictory ways of creating meaning. Therefore, within one 
discourse there can be reproductive and transformative aspects (cf. Chouliaraki 
and Fairclough 1999:63). Against this backdrop, the “we” Honneth refers to, 
provides difficulties for the analysis because it cannot be grasped clearly. In this 
thesis, the group recognition refers to, is the interviewees’ perception of their 
country and population as a community which belongs together in view of other 
international actors.  
So as to better understand the aspect of recognition, it is thus not only 
necessary to look at one dominant discourse but also to consider sub-discourses 
and to question why a certain understanding is more dominant than another one. 
For this reason, the context the discourses evolve in also has to be considered – in 
a socio-cultural and historical as well as an intertextual way (Meyer et al. 
2007:146). Why does a certain understanding dominate? Who says what in which 
context? How does a discourse relate to other? In order to answer these questions, 
one must also consider non-discursive social practices. The economic situation 
and job position of a person may very well influence his/her ways of creating 
meaning. 
For the analysis of the text as such, it makes sense to use a rather content 
related analysis instead of a linguistic analysis (cf. Jorgenson – Phillips 
2002:69;82). Features such as the chain of arguments are more likely to reveal the 
significance of recognition with regard to donor-recipient relations. This 
assessment is based on two main arguments. Firstly, language barriers play a role 
for me as a researcher and for the interviewees. For none of us English is the 
mother tongue and our use of language has developed in different contexts. 
Hence, in this case linguistic features are less reliable than content related ones. 
Secondly, all of the relevant aspects of the theory of recognition outlined in 
section 213 relate more to contents of answers than to their linguistic features. 
The concept of “warrants” provides a useful tool for this content related 
form of textual analysis. Stephen Toulmin breaks down arguments in different 
parts. He differentiates between claims (the conclusion that should be accepted) 
and evidence (which provide reasons to believe the claim). A “warrant” is the 
reasoning used to connect the two aspects of claim and evidence (Schuetz 2009). 
The three aspects of claim, warrant and evidence help to better grasp the 
interviewees’ arguments and reveal discourses relating to recognition in their 
answers. 
On the basis of the above, the following steps derive for the proceeding of 
the analysis. First of all a rather text focused analysis is performed which focuses 
on content; mainly the chains of argument. Moreover, comparisons of the 
                                                          
13 These aspects are discourses on the recognition of achievements, features, humiliation, 
independent agency of the state, acceptance in the international community. 
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discursive practice as reflected in the different interviews are discussed, as is the 
interplay between the discourses, including the interplay between dominant 
discourses and sub- or counter-discourses. Furthermore, sociocultural practices 
are important when investigating how certain discourses become dominant 
whereas others remain marginal. A second part of the analysis uses a more theory 
driven approach when analyzing the overarching social practice of recognition 
and donor-recipient relations. 
 
4.3. Organizing the interview material 
 
I conducted more than 20 interviews (see appendix 2). 17 of them are relevant for 
the discourse analysis
14
 because these interviewees are either working for local 
Malawian development NGOs, as civil servants for the ministry of development, 
ministry of foreign affairs or of finance; or they are working in another field 
which makes them experts on development issues. As every interview lasted 
around 45 to 60 minutes, the amount of material is quite large. For this reason, it 
is necessary to organize the interview material in a well-structured manner in 
order to analyze it. 
In general, both inductive and deductive ways can be used to approach 
texts. An inductive way of e.g. open coding allows eliciting patterns and 
exceptions in the text (Mikkelsen 2009: 182). One might argue that by starting off 
from the textual basis there is a smaller risk of imposing one’s own biased and 
theory driven perspective on the interviews. However, critics of inductive 
approaches argue that a researcher always has certain concepts in mind. By not 
making them explicit, the analysis can be even more biased. So as to avoid this 
bias, I use a hermeneutic approach to organize the data. Hermeneutic means that 
the relation between a specific part and the context can only be understood in a 
dynamic process of considering both aspects and their reciprocal effects on each 
other. (Meyer 2001). With regard to finding out discourses at stake, a hermeneutic 
approach therefore means to also consider theoretical insights which tell 
something about the context. 
After transcribing the interviews, they were organized to find out about the 
most frequently occurring discourses. This means, I first of all organized the 
material according to frequently occurring topics and ways of ascribing meaning. 
On this basis, I structured the topics according to broader groups. These groups 
represent what I name a ‘discourse’: an issue at stake or a general understanding 
of social processes and social coexistence, e.g. sovereignty, which is not 
necessarily directly mentioned by the interviewees but touched upon in their way 
of ascribing meaning to certain topics. Within one discourse, there usually is a 
dominant discourse and several sub-discourses. Thereafter, the different 
discourses have been clustered according to aspects of recognition they relate to. 
                                                          
14 The other interviews serve as sources of information on Sino-Malawian relations in general (e.g. 
with the Director of the Political Section and Press officer at the Chinese Embassy in Malawi (int. 
8); with the Deputy Project Manager of the Malawi International Conference Center and Business 
Hotel (Shanghai Construction Group General Company) (int. 16), or helped to facilitate contact 
with other interviewees. 
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By grouping the statements according to the forms of recognition and 
theoretically oriented subgroups, it seems as if the discourses on recognition are 
demarcated very clearly. This, however, is not the case and different forms of 
recognition may be illustrated in the same discourse. Nevertheless, categorization 
is necessary for analytical reasons. The organized interview material can be found 
in the appendix (tables 3-6). 
 
5. Analysis 
 
As a result of the theoretical and content-related discussion above, the analysis 
aims at two goals.15 First, the importance of recognition in the context of 
development assistance is discussed focusing on Chinese infrastructure projects in 
Malawi in order to generate a deeper understanding. Secondly, on the basis of 
these findings it is discussed, in how far recognition as a concept can enhance 
debates on partnership in current approaches to development. However, first of 
all, the case needs to be introduced.  
 
5.1. Introduction of the case: Chinese infrastructure projects in 
Malawi 
 
Sino-Malawian relations have hardly been subject of scientific research. The 
fieldwork I conducted in Malawi thus also aimed at getting insights into the 
agreements between China and Malawi, the sectors of cooperation and the current 
state of the projects in focus.16 The following overview only concerns 
governmental cooperation, no private investments. 
Sino-Malawian relations were established on December 28th 2007 and the 
cooperation was launched in the beginning of 2008 (Lin 2008). At that time, 
Malawi ended diplomatic relations with the Republic of China (ROC, Taiwan) in 
order to be able to start the cooperation with Beijing. With the purpose of 
fostering the One-China-Policy, the PRC does not maintain or establish 
diplomatic relations to countries which consider the ROC an independent state 
(Brautigam 2011a:67-70).  
The launch of the cooperation was manifested in a package deal: an 
agreement to take over the construction of the Karonga-Chitipa road and the 
parliament building which had been started by the ROC; and to construct a new 
stadium, a conference center and five-star hotel and a university. The construction 
                                                          
15 An overview of the analytical framework of this thesis can be found in the appendix (table 1b).  
16 The information in this section is based mainly on interviews with the Director of the Political 
Section and Press officer at the Chinese Embassy in Malawi (int. 8); with the Deputy Project 
Manager of the construction company building the Malawi International Conference Center and 
Business Hotel (Shanghai Construction Group General Company) (int. 16); the Director of the 
Debt and Aid Division of the Ministry of Finance (interviewee 18) and his assistant who works at 
the Chinese desk in the ministry (int. 19). Moreover, I rely on official documents of the Malawian 
government as well as newspaper articles. 
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of these five projects has now been finished, except for the stadium. The total cost 
is around 291 Million US-Dollars (Government of Malawi; int. 19). 
The budget for constructing the parliament building (40 million US-
Dollars) was offered as a grant. It was completed in June 2011; enforced by the 
Anhui Foreign Economic Construction Group Co., Ltd. (AFECC), to be exact the 
Sogecoa company.17 It is located in the capital city of Malawi, Lilongwe (see 
appendix no. 8). The road from Karonga to Chitipa in the North of Malawi was 
offered as a grant, too, costing around 11.5 Million US-Dollars18. It was finished 
in June 2012.  
The other three projects were funded by concessionary loans from the 
Export-Import Bank of China (Exim Bank) (Aid data 2013a, int. 8, 19). The 
conference center, five star Hotel and presidential villas required a budget of 95 
Million US-Dollars. However, only 92,5 Million US-dollars were offered as a 
loan by Exim Bank, the rest was advanced on loan by the Shanghai Construction 
group in charge of this project (int. 16). The conference center was to host the 
summit of the African Union in 2012. For this reason the construction needed to 
be expedited and was finished in April 2012. However, due to political reasons, 
the conference did not take place in Malawi. The conference center and hotel are 
currently operated by Sunbird hotels which already run two hotels in Lilongwe. 
Yet, the government has not provided an operator yet to be fully in charge of the 
conference center (int. 16).  
Construction of the University of Science and Technology in Thyolo 
(Southern Region of Malawi) was finished in 2012 requiring an 80 Million US-
Dollar loan. It was also constructed by Sogecoa (int. 19; Aid data 2013c). 
Construction of the stadium has only been started in 2012 and is not yet finished. 
The 65 Million US-Dollar project is also implemented by Sogecoa (int. 19). 
Sogecoa has played a major role in the realization of the projects agreed 
upon in the package deal of 2008. Three out of the five projects were implemented 
by them. At the same time, the company has become involved in oil exploration in 
Lake Malawi. In 2012, it acquired the license for oil exploration by the Malawian 
government without a formal application that was required by all other potential 
candidates for oil exploration (malawi today 2012). This fact evokes the 
impression that the agreement of 2008 included certain additional, non-transparent 
conditions. However, I could not obtain any concrete information on that issue.  
Malawian and Chinese cooperation has continued beyond the initial 
package deal. The most recent publication on foreign aid by the Malawian 
government (Malawi Aid Atlas 2010/2011) states that the PRC has become 
increasingly important as a donor (providing a support of 96 Million US-Dollars 
in 2010/2011). Only four donors exceeded the input by the PRC, namely USAID 
($125 Million), the World Bank ($124 Million), the British DfID ($110 Million) 
and the EU ($97 Million) (Government of Malawi 2011), making China the third 
                                                          
17 While interviewee 8 says that Sogecoa is a “private construction company”, other sources state 
that the AFECC is a Chinese state-owned enterprise (Aid data 2013b).  
18 I converted the value from the budget indicated in a report by the Malawian government. It was 
indicated in Malawi Kwacha. Due to the high instability of the Malawi Kwacha exchange rate, it is 
not possible for me to indicate the exact amount of money granted for this project.  
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largest bilateral donor to Malawi in 2010/2011.  
Apart from infrastructure, China has increasingly become involved in 
other sectors of development in Malawi: agriculture, health and education. With 
regard to agriculture, the following projects can be named: construction of an 
Agriculture Development Center in Salima was started in 2012 (int. 2) and 6000 
boreholes were installed all over Malawi (int. 8). A three-party cooperation 
between Malawi, China and the Food and Agriculture Organization coordinated 
the knowledge exchange between Malawian farmers and Chinese technicians and 
experts for agriculture technologies (int. 8). Concerning education, China supports 
Malawi mainly by granting scholarships for university studies (40 per year) and 
for training and seminars in China (200 per year) (int. 8). The health sector was 
supported by China in form of providing medication, machines and a medical 
team of 15 doctors (int. 8). Ever since the cooperation between Malawi and China 
started, there has also been a massive increase in Chinese trade with Malawi. The 
manager for planning and research of a Malawian government organization 
working on investment (int. 10) stated before establishing “diplomatic ties with 
China, FDI from China was rare but it grows significantly after the diplomatic ties 
have been established and it grows by far.” According to him, the main 
investments from China concern sectors of light manufacturing, agro-processing, 
food processing, beverages, cornflakes and electronic assemblage (int. 10).  Yet, 
due to protests in rural areas of Malawi, the national assembly has passed law in 
September 2012 in order to restrict these trade activities to urban areas. However, 
this law is not yet operational (int. 3).  
As shown by Sogecoa’s involvement in oil exploration and the increasing 
trade relations with China, there are many unresolved questions regarding details 
on intergovernmental agreements between China and Malawi. When questioned 
about repaying of the loans, the Director of the Political Section and Press officer 
at the Chinese Embassy in Malawi states “up to now, they haven't come to that 
stage of paying”. However, neither the interviewees of Malawian governmental 
agencies and ministries, nor the Chinese interviewees were able to provide 
detailed information concerning the agreements.   
 
5.2. Text based analysis 
 
5.2.1. Legal recognition: acceptance in the international community 19  
Formal recognition shall be focused on first because diplomatic relations between 
two states are the foundation for any other form of recognition. With regard to the 
analytical framework, there are supposed to be two separate sections: one on 
Malawi’s acceptance in the international community and another one on Malawi 
as an independent actor in the international arena. Yet, considering the empirical 
findings, the two aspects are not separated easily, but quite intertwined as shown 
by the following analysis of formal recognition. For this reason, the following 
section discusses both categories simultaneously.  
                                                          
19 See table 3 in the appendix for an overview of the statements this section is based upon. 
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The main discourse at play here is Malawi’s sovereignty. Sovereignty can 
be understood as “absolute control [by the government] of a territory in a legal 
sense” (Nye 2009:168). This definition implies both: the possibility for a 
government to act independently as well as acceptance as an independent actor in 
the international community.  
Even though only the sovereignty discourse can be demarcated clearly, 
content wise there are several subgroups relating to this major discourse. These 
subgroups are discussed in order to reveal the interviewees’ underlying 
understanding of Malawi as a sovereign state. 
Launch of diplomatic relations 
First and foremost, many interviewees refer to the establishment of Malawi’s and 
the PRC’s cooperation. Malawi ended diplomatic relations with the ROC (Taiwan) 
so as to cooperate with the PRC (Mainland China) in 2007 (Brautigam 2011a:68). 
The interviewees do not reflect upon this matter very much but mention it as a 
natural occurrence in Malawi’s history (int. 10, 18, 9, 2). Therefore, the 
interviewees’ answers reflect a self-evident understanding of Malawi as a 
sovereign state. Malawi is seen as free to agree to or end diplomatic relations with 
other states. There is no doubt about Malawi’s sovereignty in this sense. 
Therefore, there is no doubt about legal recognition as such. However, one can 
argue that the PRC offered greater financial support and therefore Malawi was not 
totally free in the decision whether or not to agree to the offers. Economic 
constraints are definitively involved. 
Aid conditionality 
The sovereignty discourse is also found in the interviewees’ assessment of China’s 
aid policies. In particular, almost all of the participants referred to the fact that 
China does not pose conditions on Malawi with regard to political matters. A chief 
economist in the Ministry of Development gave the following answer when being 
asked to compare western and Chinese aid:  
“China; they do not demand any conditions for their aid […]. It means 
they are giving you freedom. They are not tying you down. […] So 
this aid with no conditions can […] maybe aid a developing country 
more” (int. 17). 
 His claim is that aid without conditions is more helpful than help with conditions. 
The evidence he provides for the claim is Malawi’s freedom and independence to 
make choices because of not being constrained by conditions. Interviewee 17’s 
argument follows the logic that it is most effective to follow own decisions instead 
of being told what to do. He therefore shows an understanding of sovereignty as 
the right of a government to autonomously take decisions. China’s non-
interference policy therefore means to Malawians that Malawi is taken seriously 
as an independent actor. The warrant used by interviewee 17 occurs similarly in 
many interviews (int. 19, 20, 21, 17, 13, 12, 11, 6, 2; partly by 5, 9). Several 
interviewees characterize the partnership as “simplified and straight forward” (int. 
21), “empower[ing]” (int. 13), “for the people” (int. 12). Others refer to China as 
“a friend in need” (int. 11) or having “love to give freely” (int. 6). At the same 
time, some interviewees underline how conditions to aid create problems for 
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developing countries (e.g. int. 13, 2). So the interviewees’ answers show that 
China’s non-interference to them expresses recognition of Malawi as a sovereign 
state because Malawi is not restricted by conditions.  
However, there is also a counter-discourse occurring in the interviews 
when it comes to the matter of conditions: the discourse of non-transparency. 
Some interviewees (int. 5, 9, 14) mention a suspicion about China not imposing 
conditions. They fear upcoming conditions which might create massive problems 
for Malawi. This discourse will be tackled in more detail in part 5.2.2.2. 
Support of projects without funding from western donors 
Following the discourse on Malawi’s sovereignty, many interviewees point out 
how China enables projects which would not be supported by other donors (int. 
18, 12, 7, 4, 3). One of them is the director of the Debt and Aid Division of the 
Ministry of Finance: 
“The main comparative advantage that I see with the Chinese 
aid is that the Chinese are willing to go into areas where very few 
other cooperate partners are willing to go and that is in infrastructure. 
I don’t think you can easily convince most of our cooperate partners to 
come and construct a stadium for us. I don't think you can easily 
convince most of our cooperate partners, traditional donors, to 
construct these buildings, so the parliament, the conference center and 
so forth. So the Chinese are coming in to address those resources 
which would have otherwise been difficult for us to mobilize. So I 
think that's the main comparative advantage that I see with the 
Chinese” (int. 18) 
As pointed out by Deborah Brautigam (2011a:28,77), the focus of 
dominant approaches to development is on social development. This assessment is 
reflected in interviewee 18’s response. He argues that there is a gap in donor-
support of infrastructure projects; yet this is needed in Malawi. Thus, his answer 
expresses that Malawi’s actual needs are embraced and taken seriously by China. 
This, again, implies recognition of Malawi’s sovereignty: the needs detected by 
Malawi are taken seriously by China without questioning their necessity. 
Malawi’s perception of these projects as genuine need for the country’s 
development is accepted by China. Interviewee 7 brings in a supplementary aspect 
by referring to the Paris Declaration, thus combining the aspect of conditionalities 
and self-assessment of project-needs:  
“Then you say, okay if you are giving us aid without 
preconditions, then that's what we need. Why, because that is […] 
somehow in line I think with the Paris Declaration. Because what you 
are saying is: every country has to develop its own strategy and the 
donors have to be there simply to support, what the recipient country 
feels is good for them.” (int. 7) 
Both – China’s proceeding of not imposing supplementary political 
conditions and China’s support of projects which are not funded by other donors 
but represent genuine needs for Malawians – are part of the Chinese principle of 
non-interference (Brautigam 2011a:134). This principle means to the interviewees 
that Malawi’s sovereignty is recognized, mainly in terms of decision making. For 
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this reason, the Paris Declaration’s principle of ownership is a reasonable point to 
be mentioned by interviewee 7. He raises the question if ownership and 
sovereignty are compatible with conditionalities and non-support of projects 
which are important in Malawi’s assessment? This question will be revisited in 
part 5.4.  
The dominant discourse within the discourse on sovereignty is the 
understanding of China as a donor who does not force conditions upon the 
Malawian government: neither political and economic conditions nor strict 
requirements concerning the type of projects constructed. So the interviewees 
mainly perceive China’s role as a donor who is supportive of Malawi’s agency 
and sovereignty. Nevertheless, the counter-discourse expressing suspicion about 
China not imposing conditions is relevant with regard to Malawi’s sovereignty. It 
reflects the underlying comprehension that China is a powerful actor with the 
power to harm Malawi.  
5.2.2. Political recognition 
While the aspect of legal recognition has already shed light on obstacles 
concerning the constitution of an equitable donor-recipient relation, the analysis 
now focuses on discourses relating to the aspect of political recognition and 
symbolic interaction between states.  
5.2.2.1. Recognition of achievements or features20 
Three discourses are relevant regarding different ways of recognition for 
achievements or features: modernization, internationalization and prestige.  
Modernization 
As mentioned above modernization theory can be briefly summed up as a theory 
of societal progress deriving from economic growth and integration, technological 
advancement and efficiency. With regard to modernization discourse, the 
statement by a principal economist of the Ministry of Economic Planning and 
Development exemplarily reflects the idea of progress: “by the end of the day we 
want to see Malawi go forward” (int. 7). The use of the word “go forward” returns 
in several other statements by other interviewees using similar vocabulary: e.g. 
“move out from where we are to the next level” (int. 10), “cannot live the past 
life” (int. 6). The notion of progress is mirrored in more concrete explanations 
about changes on the level of economy, efficiency and technology. Interviewee 11 
for example points out that “[w]hat they have built is modern technology. It's 
high, it's good” (int. 11). As interviewee 11 equalizes high with good, the majority 
of the interviewees connects the new projects as such with progress on different 
levels and evaluates this positively (int. 2, 6, 7, 10, 11, 12). Moreover, efficiency 
plays a major role with regard to modernity coming into effect on two levels. On 
the one hand, many interviewees value highly the very efficient realization of the 
infrastructure projects: “I can see that it's moving at very fast pace” (int. 18, cf. 
19, 4). On the other hand, the interviewees emphasize that the projects have 
drastically improved efficiency of everyday life. They mainly refer to the time 
                                                          
20 See table 4 in the appendix for an overview of the statements this section is based upon. 
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saved when traveling from Karonga to Chitipa, as e.g. interviewee 4 “11 hours to 
2.5 hours: is that not development?” (cf. int. 3, 4, 5, 11, 14, 17). Overall, the 
interviewees’ chain of argumentation with regard to modernization is as follows: 
They claim that technological etc. changes installed by Chinese projects are 
necessary, due to an ultimate need for progress and efficiency.  
Nevertheless, there is criticism concerning the quality of the projects. 
Repeatedly, the low quality of Chinese products is criticized. The interviewees 
transfer their experiences with Chinese products to the durability of the 
constructed projects (e.g. int. 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 20). “They are not durable but you still 
have a new thing” (int. 7) is an exemplary assessment of the situation. New is 
equated with progress so that even supposedly non-durable but new buildings are 
equated with a certain degree of progress. Certain interviewees likewise criticize 
the projects’ focus on infrastructure while to them it would be more urgent to 
address rural poverty (int. 2, 5, 9, 11, 13, 14, 20). Some only see rural poverty 
addressed in the road project (int. 2, 17, 11). Nonetheless, these interviewees 
appreciate the overall progress reflected by the projects. Interviewee 2 for 
example points out that the “modern structures” in the capital are difficult to be 
appreciated by people in rural areas where the majority of Malawians live. 
However, his argument follows the logic of a trickle-down effect: he suggests that 
the development in the cities will encroach on rural areas later on. This critical 
sub-discourse therefore still follows the logic of modernization discourse. 
Only one interviewee clearly reflects a counter-discourse: dependency 
theory. Interviewee 9 points out that “[i]f they were bringing in industrialization 
when you have machines – that would create employment for the people! But 
these [Chinese] developments, they are just done”. Furthermore he notes that “the 
conference center right now is not useful. Right now they don't use it […]. So I 
think, it came earlier just to beautify the city” (int. 9). In his view, the cooperation 
clearly leads to an increasing dependence because the knowledge about 
industrialization remains with the contractors. Also other interviewees criticize the 
fact of Chinese laborers working for the construction (int. 2, 17, 21). Yet, only 
interviewee 9 goes as far as denigrating all of the projects “To me, beauty coming 
before time, it's not beauty”. He is very much in favor of community based social 
development. 
The above shows that modernization theory is the dominant discourse in 
the interviewees’ ways of argumentation. It serves as a framework of evaluation. 
Progress in terms of economy, efficiency and technology is an achievement which 
is valued with regard to Malawian development processes. Yet, so far, nothing has 
been said about the matter of recognition. By analyzing discourses on 
internationalization and prestige, it becomes clear how the achievements of 
modernization are related to recognition. 
Internationalization and prestige21 
Certain interview questions aimed at gaining insights into the aspect of prestige. 
For example, I asked about the symbolic value and visibility of changes in Malawi 
caused by Chinese infrastructure projects. The beauty of the buildings and the 
                                                          
21 See table 4 in the appendix. 
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significant changes in the capital were two main issues coming up in many 
interviews. “Beauty” and “prestige” can be illustrated by the example of 
interviewee 12: 
“In terms of the capitals  [cities in Africa] Malawi is almost 
the last in terms of beauty. So when the Chinese have built the new 
things, people are happy to say now: our capital is coming up! We 
want to be compared with other countries.” 
Analyzing the linguistic features of this statement, several aspects are 
striking. The word “beauty” is equalized with progress (“coming up”) and is seen 
as measurable on a scale (“be compared”, “almost the last”). Interviewee 12's 
statement reflects a desire for being proud of the capital and for being “compared 
with” other countries. The last sentence implies the idea of having a status 
comparable to other countries and to be recognized by others. There is a chain of 
arguments here: beauty implies progress which again implies recognition by 
others. This chain can be found in many other interviewees' answers (int. 14, 12, 
11, 9, 13).  
The feeling of happiness is connected to the upcoming beauty interviewee 
11 talks about. This connection is also expressed in other interviewees' answers 
(int. 5, 12, 14, 4). Interviewee 4 for example refers to his experience of visiting 
the Parliament in a very positive manner, also connecting happiness with beauty: 
“It was wonderful, very very magnificent building and I was happy to be there”.  
Beauty can also work as encouragement for Malawians, as Interviewee 14 points 
out “The beauty […] will encourage the people to look at things in a positive 
way.” To him, a beautified city necessarily creates beauty of the citizens. To sum 
up this argument, there is a number of interviewees who agree on the idea that the 
construction of new buildings increases the beauty of the capital and consequently 
transmits beauty onto the nation and the citizens. It allows for increased national 
pride. This understanding is the dominant discourse reflected in the interviews. 
However, there are several counter-discourses, too. All interviewees appreciate the 
beauty of the new buildings, yet some are critical about it: “To me, beauty coming 
before time, it's not beauty” (int. 9). Interviewee 9 points out, how many social 
problems exist in Malawi which should be solved first instead of constructing 
impressive buildings. To him, it is mainly disturbing that the conference centre is 
not in use and thus only serving as a “landmark” with no significance. 
Nevertheless, such doubtful remarks concerning the beauty are less common 
among the interviewees. The dominant narrative is that the projects create beauty 
allowing for greater pride of the country. The fact that this beauty is created 
through foreign grants and loans does neither diminish the beauty nor the pride. 
The terms “beauty” and “magnificence” are mentioned numerous times 
(int. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 12, 14, 20) with regard to the projects. These positive 
attributes refer to the visual aspects of the projects. In a similar manner as the 
interviewee above, the following interviewee illustrates the relation between 
beauty and pride of the capital “Lilongwe is our capital. So if our capital city is 
seen as beautiful, it's the pride of the country” (int. 13). Furthermore he points out 
that it is especially relevant to have visible signs of importance in the capital 
“when someone comes in a foreign country” (int. 13). So prestige is on the one 
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hand relevant for the population and on the other hand it is valued by the 
population for reasons of recognition by non-Malawians. The argument thus goes 
as follows – prestige adds value to the country which leads to international 
recognition. 
This nexus of prestige and international recognition is also reflected in the 
interviewees' emphasis on Malawi's internationalization. The director of the Debt 
and Aid Division of the Ministry of Finance states that Malawi was the “only 
country in the region which did not have a proper international conference center 
but now we do have one and we can now host international meetings, we can now 
host head of states” (int. 18). The word “international” occurs twice and 
interviewee 18 refers to “head of states”. This statement reflects that the 
conference center contributes to Malawi’s internationalization. Malawi has not 
only become more integrated in processes of cross-border activities, it is now 
perceived as an actor of importance in international political events. Southern 
African Development Community (SADC) and African Union (AU) meetings 
were mentioned by several interviewees (int. 4, 14, 16). Apparently, the 
interviewees value the fact that influential international actors are now more likely 
to visit Malawi. 
Moreover, several interviewees assume an increase in international tourism 
because of the five-star hotel (int. 17, 13, 12, 4). Apparently internationalization is 
not only of value because of high-level visits by presidents. Interviewee 13 points 
out: “People, at the end of the day will be able to know that there is Malawi on the 
world map” (int. 13). The argument concerns two aspects. First, the newly 
constructed buildings lead to Malawi being noticed internationally because they 
attract international visitors or politicians. Second, the newly constructed 
buildings add value to the appearance of Malawi, especially the capital Lilongwe.  
At this point the connection to the modernization discourse becomes 
evident. The parliament, especially the conference center and the stadium are 
argued to be beautiful, adding prestige and turning Malawi into an internationally 
integrated place. The modernization discourse constitutes the benchmark for this 
assessment: As the projects correspond to criteria as efficiency, technological 
changes and economic growth, they symbolize Malawi's progress. In this light 
they are reflecting beauty: the beauty of progress and success. Due to these 
obvious changes in the capital, the international importance is argued to have 
increased because Malawi has more to offer internationally (conference center, 
beautiful buildings, presidential houses). The changes hence reflect achievements 
which lead to international recognition. 
In the interviews, international recognition of Malawi's achievements is 
mainly framed by a discourse following modernization theory. Since the 
modernization discourse is so dominant in the interviewees’ answers, they seem to 
feel mainly recognized by international actors (presidents and tourists) for 
achievements of modernization. Counter-discourses on dependency and social 
development, however, do play a role. As mentioned above, several interviewees 
point out the importance of solving rural poverty and therefore criticize certain 
aspects of the Chinese infrastructure investments. To them, incorporating 
Malawians into the construction process for employment purposes is of great 
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importance. Social development therefore plays an important role, too. 
Nevertheless, the end products are valued highly by the interviewees for their 
modernizing value. The aspect of progress remains important. 
Two main findings can be summarized. First of all, achievements of 
prestige – such as beautiful buildings and progress in technology or efficiency – 
play a role in order for the interviewees to feel worthy to be recognized and to feel 
recognized. Secondly, when analyzing recognition, it is important to pay attention 
to the dominant discourse which frames the achievements to be recognized for, in 
the case of Malawi it is the modernization discourse.  
Of course, it can be argued that the research focus lies on infrastructure 
projects which are more likely to be associated with modernization than e.g. 
education or health projects. So there is a risk of circular arguing: Looking at 
modernization related projects, the modernization discourse of course turns out to 
be the dominant one. So should all the above be dropped again? It may not be 
possible to argue that modernization is more appreciated with regard to 
development in Malawi than e.g. social development. However, it is impossible to 
investigate matters such as prestige and symbolic recognition, if not focusing on a 
case which connects to these aspects. So the choice of these five projects is still 
justified.  The argument becomes even stronger: Even interviewees who are 
mainly working for social development (int. 20, 14, 12, 11, 9, 6, 5, 4, 13) point out 
the importance of efficiency, technology and economic growth which they 
associate with the beauty, visibility and prestige of the infrastructure projects. 
Clearly, the interviewees see the projects as symbols of progress making Malawi 
worthy to be recognized internationally. 
5.2.2.2. Humiliation: discourses on power-imbalance22 
When discussing humiliation, Honneth suggests that oftentimes public opinion 
provides narratives of humiliation which serve as a basis for decision-making 
processes in foreign politics. Several experiences of humiliation play a role in the 
interviewees' lines of argumentation; namely nontransparent processes, Malawi as 
a non-powerful actor/ least developed country (LDC) and – to a minor degree – 
domination by western countries. 
Non-transparency 
Regarding non-transparent processes, there are two slightly different lines of 
argumentation. On the one hand, interviewees criticize the lack of public 
involvement of citizens. On the other hand, many participants express concerns 
about the future of the cooperation and possible upcoming demands by China. The 
former is distinctly brought forth by interviewee 9:  
 “Because still now, many Malawians don't know – what 
is a grant among the projects and which one is a loan. Because the 
executive does that and there is no proper communication to the local 
level, to the ground – so everyone can be aware. The impact is that we 
might end up with a lot of infrastructure that have been done by the 
Chinese without our full involvement. Because we are not fully 
                                                          
22 See table 5 in the appendix for an overview of the statements this section is based upon. 
38 
 
involved.” (int. 9) 
In his account, the cooperation is only taking place at governmental level, 
as the word “executive” implies. There is no “involvement”, thus no agency of the 
majority of the population. The great majority even rests uninformed. The 
statement reflects the projects as top-down approaches which do not take into 
account the majority of Malawians: decisions are made without their consent. 
Hence, he reflects a civil society oriented understanding of governance: 
governance should be based on and including civil society (Chambers et al 2009).  
This concern is shared by other interviewees (int. 14, 6) but does not represent the 
dominant understanding reflected in the interviews. Yet, these three interviewees 
point out a relevant aspect concerning the question of recognition/humiliation. 
Just as in other African countries, negotiations in Malawi mainly took place 
without consulting the national parliament (Dubosse 2010:80; int. 2). The 
centralised decision-making processes thus tend to exclude the people's 
representatives. Hence, exclusion of the public from decision-making processes is 
somewhat humiliating for the Malawian population. However, this is rather 
unimportant to most interviewees – only interviewees 14, 6 and 9 point out the 
lack of civil societal participation.  
Another concern about non-transparency that is very frequently expressed 
touches upon a different level. It is shared by several interviewees (int. 2, 5, 9, 11, 
20). “What is it these guys are getting from us […] It could be people at top 
government level are aware of that but I'm not” (int. 2) is stated by a chief legal 
officer at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This officer was even present in 
negotiations about the parliament and conference center but points out that the 
contracts are closed. At the same time he expects similar developments in Malawi 
as in other African countries which cooperate with China. These concerns refer to 
a dominant discourse concerning African-Chinese cooperation: resource 
extraction/exploitation. While some of the interviewees neglect that China might 
be aiming for Malawian resources (int. 8, 12), interviewee 9 brings up Sogecoa’s 
involvement in oil-exploration in Lake Malawi (see section 5.1.). In any case, 
concerns exist that there are negative ramifications to come which cannot be 
foreseen at present by the majority of Malawians. It can be argued that this 
uncertainty contains a moment of humiliation; for the citizens are not informed, 
thus not taken seriously (or just ignored). Moreover, they expect unpleasant 
surprises of resource extraction. In the line of argumentation of the interviewees, 
these non-transparent processes reflect a clear power imbalance. 
Vulnerability 
The moment of power-imbalance is also reflected by many statements about 
Malawi being a developing country, LDC and a small state. These statements can 
be labeled as the vulnerable state discourse (c.f. Lee – Smith 2010). One of the 
principal economists at the Ministry of Economic Planning and Development 
points out, “In a case you are a country that is so much looking for aid, you have a 
case where there are no preconditions, then it's good for you” (int. 7). By using the 
emphasizing expression “so much”, the interviewee clearly depicts Malawi as a 
powerless actor: help is desperately needed. This account of Malawi's incapacity 
of acting independently is also depicted in answers by other interviewees. The 
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whole country is subsumed in a generalizing account as being “poor” (int. 12, 6), 
in need of outside “assistance”, “aid” or empowerment (int. 4, 7, 11), being 
unknown (int. 13). On the one hand, this vulnerable state discourse serves as a 
narrative legitimizing the need for foreign grants and loans. On the other hand, it 
has a connotation of humiliation because Malawi's government and population are 
depicted as utterly in need of support and thus powerless. So the warrant in the 
argument works as follows: the interviewees claim Malawi being in need of 
outside support which they proof by stating how poor and vulnerable Malawi is 
on its own. This warrant, however, obviously reinforces the power-imbalance 
between donor and recipient because it suggests that Malawian agency is only 
possible with outside help.  
Domination by western countries 
Only a few interviewees explicitly criticize western supremacy in Malawi. “But 
for the west we find, there's nothing they do apart from squeezing you” is 
remarked by interviewee 12. This metaphor expresses a clear power-imbalance in 
Malawian relations to western states. A more nuanced depiction of this power-
imbalance is given by a chief economist in the Ministry of Development. He 
refers to “problems accessing your markets, for instance in Europe” (int. 16). Due 
to western dominance, Malawi is powerless – that's the essence of this discourse. 
Both interviewees tie in with dependency theory. Nevertheless, the discourse of 
humiliation by western supremacy is not dominating the interviews. They reflect a 
general understanding of Malawi as a rather powerless actor in international 
relations and development processes in general. This applies to Sino-Malawian 
cooperation as well as Malawian cooperation with western countries. 
Concluding the analysis of aspects of humiliation, it is necessary to discuss 
the extent of humiliation. The discourses drawn upon in the interviews do not 
relate to narratives of active humiliation of Malawi by another country. They 
rather describe an overarching narrative of Malawi as vulnerable and powerless 
which is exemplified by many different situations in interstate relations. While 
this assessment of power-imbalances mainly concerns interstate relations, the 
interviewees also mention elitism in the political system: only very high-level 
governmental officials are fully informed and included in the decision-making 
processes. 
5.2.3. Which discourses dominate and what is the reason? 
This section aims at joining the depiction of the main discourses with the 
empirical foundation and theoretical framework. So as to discuss the importance 
of recognition for donor-recipient relations, it is indispensable to consider why 
certain discourses become dominant. In the discourse analysis, the following 
dominant discourses were identified: sovereignty, power-imbalance, non-
transparency, prestige, modernization and internationalization. The former three 
are interrelated as are the latter three. That is why the two groups will be 
discussed in separate sections. 
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Power (im)balance: sovereignty and non-transparency 
The overarching discourse here is power (im)balance. However, it concerns two 
different levels: the interstate level (sovereignty) and the intrastate level 
(transparency). The interviewees’ answers refer to both levels and link to the 
overarching discourse on power-imbalance. The sample of interviewees provides 
helpful links in order to find out reasons why the discourse on power imbalance 
may be dominant.   
In sum, the interviewees’ societal and employment related positions are at 
the intersection between high-level government and civil society. In this spectrum 
– based on their positions – the NGO representatives are closer to civil society 
whereas the civil servants are closer to the government. Neither of them belongs 
to the most powerful elite within Malawian society (Cammack 2012:376) and 
neither of them is part of the hardly influential rural population. Yet, they have 
insights into both groups. For this reason, it can be assumed that the interviewees 
have both levels in mind when reasoning.  
The dominant discourse within the discourse on sovereignty is the 
understanding of China as a donor who does not enforce conditions upon the 
Malawian government; neither political and economic conditions nor strict 
requirements concerning the type of projects constructed. So the interviewees 
mainly perceive China’s role as a donor as rather supportive of Malawi’s agency 
and sovereignty. Nevertheless, the suspicion about China not imposing conditions 
that is expressed in the sub-discourse is relevant with regard to Malawi’s 
sovereignty. It implies the underlying comprehension that in the end, China is a 
powerful actor which might harm Malawi. This sub-discourse is, however, 
represented by only three interviewees who are representatives of NGOs (int. 5, 9, 
14). Yet, they still evaluate Chinese non-interference as supportive of Malawi’s 
agency and sovereignty. What might be the reason behind this rather positive 
assessment of non-conditionality? The interviewees are all engaged in political 
activities in Malawi – either on the governmental or on the non-governmental 
level. Only one of them is a representative of an NGO working on human rights 
issues; the vast majority works on development, be it in NGOs or in the Ministry 
of Development (int. 21, 20, 19, 18, 17, 14, 13, 11, 9, 7, 6, 5, 4).  Hence, the 
majority of the interviewees is likely to be familiar to issues of donor funding and 
conditionalities. The Chinese policy of non-interference leaves scope for action 
and decisions. It is thus very likely that representatives of the development sector 
value this unconditional aid. It would be very interesting to include more 
representatives of human rights organizations into the sample and compare their 
assessments. The example of interviewee 14
23
 suggests that human rights activists 
would be more concerned about China’s non-interference.  
The dominant discourse on non-transparency relates to power imbalance at 
intrastate level. As mentioned above, the interviewees are at the intersection 
between high-level government and civil society. Hence, only one of them (int. 2) 
participated in the negotiations and none of them has clear insights into the 
                                                          
23 Interviewee 14 states: “The Chinese say, we'll build you a stadium. But we have nothing to do 
with whether the people going to the stadium will be slapped on their way going to the stadium” 
(int. 14). 
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agreements. So the discourse on non-transparency is very much related to the 
interviewees’ role in society: On the one hand, they are engaged in the political 
processes related to Malawi’s development but on the other hand, they are not 
fully informed about decision-making processes. Because of their political 
engagement, they are very much aware of issues the government keeps secret. So 
the dominance of the discourse on non-transparency can be explained by the 
interviewees’ role in society. Their informed but restricted role in political 
processes might be their reason to criticize the non-transparency of Sino-
Malawian cooperation. Therefore, it is plausible they are tying into a civil society 
oriented understanding of governance which pleads for transparency of political 
processes
24
.  
Even though the interviewees reflect critical perspectives on the level of 
intrastate power imbalance and the relation between political elites and less 
influential political actors, they do appreciate the fact that the Malawian 
government has greater decision-making power due to the Chinese policy of non-
interference.  
Prestige, internationalization and modernization 
In the discourse analysis the interrelation between these three discourses has 
already been explained. In general, the interviewees share a positive assessment of 
the modernization related features (mainly progress and efficiency) concerning 
the projects of the package deal. Their reasoning is as follows: The modernizing 
aspects of the projects add on the prestige of the country and thus allow for 
international recognition. So the modernization discourse frames the assessment 
of the projects. Their prestigious value is mainly based on their modernization 
attributes – but why? 
At this point, the previous reflections about current debates on 
development are helpful. In particular the criticism of postdevelopment positions 
serves as a framework to explain why the modernization discourse is so dominant. 
Scholars in this field criticize that the idea of modernizing and improving the 
situation of so called developing countries is inherent in any idea of development. 
It is therefore inevitable that progress and efficiency are widely spread values in 
the field of development (Ziai 2009:183). Thus, aspects of modernization are very 
likely to be found in any discourse on development. As the vast majority of the 
interviewees work in the development sector, it is also very likely that they reflect 
aspects of modernization discourse in their reasoning and assessment.
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The above points out reasons why the discourses analyzed in the discourse 
analysis are the dominant ones. The reasons mainly relate to the interviewees’ 
positions in society and their work place. Based on these reflections, the question 
arises whether or not the findings can to some extent be generalized. Are the 
                                                          
24
 Transparency International is one of the leading actors influencing the global discourse on 
transparency. Their definition of transparency is as follows: “Transparency guarantees that 
governments and companies provide open, accessible, timely and understandable information 
about their activities, funding and spending.” (Fagan 2013:2)  
25 To develop a generalizable argument from the modernization discourse, a second empirical 
study would need to take place: ordinary people who do not work in the development sector need 
to be included in the sample of interviewees so as to avoid a possible bias.  
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results relevant for the majority of Malawi’s citizens? Of course, the interviewees 
reflect the understanding of a certain group of people engaged in development 
matters. Yet, they are at the intersection between high-level government and civil 
society. So based on their societal position and political role, it is very likely that 
they not only reflect their working place positions but also have in mind vast parts 
of civil society and governmental actors. 
 
5.3. Criticism on recognition in development: recognition vs. 
redistribution  
The discourse analysis examines recognition as a factor in international relations.  
It is thus mainly concerned with symbolic aspects and matters of identity 
regarding development assistance. Drawing on the basic understanding of 
development as “a matter of re-shaping and improving people's living conditions, 
through economic, political and social processes”, the most obvious criticism 
against this thesis is to question the relevance of recognition for development. To 
put it in another way, one can ask if this thesis aims at displacing projects of 
poverty reduction with the construction of representative buildings. Do symbolic 
aspects actually matter in a field dealing with poverty reduction, water supply and 
food security (Eriksson Baaz 2005:10)? Or might focusing on recognition lead to 
consolidation of unequal power-relations? 
In the discussion of the theoretical framework, this has already been 
reflected upon from a more abstract perspective. Honneth counters this criticism 
with two arguments. First, he points out that the aim of recognition is always to 
increase the counterpart’s autonomy (Honneth 2010:105). Second, he argues that 
mere symbolic action is not credible if not corresponding to actions such as 
material changes (Honneth 2010:110).  
At this point the criticism and counterargument must be related to the 
empirical findings. Concerning the criticism of a possible trade-off which replaces 
LDCs’ material needs with recognition, Honneth’s argument is proven right by 
the interview material. All of the interviewees highlight the economic and social 
benefits of the projects in the same manner as the symbolic aspects when being 
asked about the projects’ value (see table 6 in the appendix). They refer to an 
increase of foreign investments, capacities of higher education and improvement 
on the level of democratic institutions. Hence, the interviewees attest a clear social 
and material value to the projects, not only a symbolic one. Yet, the sub-discourse 
on rural poverty reflects criticism that rural poverty is only marginally tackled by 
these projects. The interviewees’ assessments thus reflect this tension of 
recognition versus redistribution. On the basis of the empirical material one can 
therefore argue that both aspects are important for development cooperation. 
Indeed, both aspects are also accredited to the package deal.  
The above implicitly answers the question whether or not recognition 
consolidates power imbalances. Since the interviewees are very aware of material 
as well as recognition needs of their country, they do the opposite of consolidating 
power imbalances. Their critical awareness of both aspects proves a realistic 
possibility of transforming power relations. Following Honneth’s argument of 
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recognition fostering autonomy, one can argue that by feeling recognized as an 
international actor, it becomes more likely for politically engaged people in 
Malawi to speak out against matters of injustice in general. Here too, the 
empirical material provides evidence: Interviewees e.g. criticize power imbalance 
and non-transparency – they do speak out against power imbalances. Of course, 
this empirical observation does not prove a causal relation. There is no evidence 
to assume that it is recognition making them speak out and work against power 
imbalances. However, the interview data also does not prove the contrary. There 
is no reason to conclude that recognition consolidates power imbalances. In order 
to prove this criticism right or wrong a more focused empirical analysis would 
need to be performed.  
Finally, Wolf’s (2008) criticism needs to be addressed. He emphasizes the 
difficulty to empirically distinguish the aspiration of recognition/respect from the 
striving for material goals or other interests. In his opinion, an empirical 
investigation should therefore focus on situations where neither material interests 
nor materially disadvantaged actors striving for respect are involved. This strategy 
may be reasonable with regard to conflicts, yet does not make sense with regard to 
development cooperation. As shown by the discourse analysis both aspects are 
important in development assistance: being recognized as an independent actor 
whose achievements manifest value as well as redistribution of material 
imbalances. So when analyzing development cooperation – as compared to e.g. 
conflict processes – it is even more difficult to empirically distinguish recognition 
from other factors. As argued above, it is the nature of development assistance to 
first and foremost address material needs and inequalities. In this field, 
recognition and redistribution are inevitably intertwined. Therefore, it is very 
difficult to clearly distinguish the two factors. Mere symbolic recognition, which 
does not imply action, does not create a relationship of recognition but appears 
insincere. Mere material redistribution can be interpreted as paternalistic action 
and thus reinforce power imbalances (cf. Eriksson Baaz 2005). Wolf’s (2008) 
criticism hence does not really apply to the field of development assistance. 
 
5.4. Theory driven discussion: recognition and donor-recipient 
relations 
At this point, the empirical findings have to be combined with the theoretical goal 
of this thesis. To do so, we shall recall the research question: To what extent does 
the analysis of Sino-Malawian relations from a recognition perspective provide 
insights to develop a complementary understanding of the partnership approach in 
development debates? In addition to the original goal, the empirical insights shall 
also be used to shed light on Honneth’s theory. Certain aspects can be amplified 
by the empirical data in order to make the theory of recognition more fruitful for 
development debates and IR.  
In the discussion of the package deal the significant role of recognition in 
development assistance becomes evident. The discourse analysis points out 
specific discourses exemplifying how recognition and humiliation may come into 
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effect: prestige, internationalization, modernization, sovereignty, power imbalance 
and non-transparency. 
Sovereignty and donor-recipient relations 
The sovereignty discourse is linked to what Honneth calls legal recognition. 
Following Honneth, the aspect of legal recognition concerns only the question 
whether diplomatic ties exist between two states and if the state is approved by the 
international community. Hence, legal recognition is about the international 
community accepting a government’s sovereign governance of a territory. With 
regard to Malawi, there is no doubt about its legal recognition in the international 
community because Malawi was the state who had the power of decision 
regarding the PRC’s status as opposed to the ROC. 
In Honneth’s theory, legal recognition only plays a minor role (Honneth 
2010:187). Yet, the interviews show that sovereignty matters in many additional 
ways as opposed to the mere question of existing diplomatic ties. Aid 
conditionality and the focus on funding certain projects are being perceived as 
interfering with Malawi’s decision-making power. Hence, donors seem to 
interfere with Malawi’s sovereignty. It becomes clear that sovereignty 
interference is relevant to development assistance.
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In IR theory, state sovereignty has been the focus of many debates, e.g. on 
conflicts. One important scholar in the field is Joseph Nye. According to him, 
state sovereignty refers to the government’s control over a territory in a legal way. 
However, the actual control can be affected in multiple ways (Nye 2009:168). If 
defined in a wide sense, intervention “refers to external actions that influence the 
domestic affairs of another sovereign state” (Nye 2009:166). Nye argues that even 
speeches and economic aid are forms of intervention although representing rather 
soft forms. Moreover, he points out that intervention in terms of capacity building 
may also be supportive of sovereignty (Nye 2009:168-169). Yet, in addition, the 
concept of sovereignty refers to a government’s responsibility towards its people 
(Glanville 2011). So if a state does not take this responsibility, there may even be 
a need to intervene. 
Nye’s reflections on sovereignty and intervention help to grasp the aspect 
of sovereignty in the field of development more clearly. On this basis, it can be 
argued that state sovereignty is a very sensitive issue, especially in development 
cooperation. As argued before, the colonial experience and continuous structural 
inequality are immense obstacles when it comes to the matter of establishing 
equitable donor-recipient relations. This difficulty is reflected in the sovereignty 
discourse. The fact that China’s non-interference is valued very highly by the 
interviewees shows how political interference appears as a threat to sovereignty. 
Several interviewees’ statements about western dominance support this argument. 
In this sense, sovereignty seems to be threatened by political conditions and 
decision-making beyond Malawi’s reach. So as to build up an equitable relation, 
donors have to be aware of the gradual nuances in interference. How could 
                                                          
26 The interviewees in general state that China does not establish political or economic conditions. 
Yet, one can argue that the One-China-Policy and the need for Malawi to end diplomatic relations 
with the ROC, are political conditions China imposes on Malawi. However, since the interviewees 
do not refer to this fact as a constraint, it is not further touched upon in this thesis.  
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ownership and partnership take place or develop if the recipient is not treated as 
sovereign country? And what does it mean to be treated as a sovereign country? 
In 2011, several donors decided to cut down budget support for Malawi, 
including the World Bank, the EU, Great Britain, the African Development Bank, 
Germany and Norway (Tran 2011). Their decision was primarily based on the 
human rights record of the country, e.g. violations of the right to freedom of 
assembly, freedom of speech, freedom of press and the persecution of homosexual 
women (BMZ 2011). Since Malawi’s government changed in 2012 following the 
death of former president Bingu Wa Mutharika, Malawi’s relation to the donor 
community improved. The new president Joyce Banda rapidly implemented 
multiple reforms. Therefore donors, as e.g. Germany, confirmed to increase 
budget support again (EPO 2012). In Malawi, the experience of being constrained 
by political conditions is very present. However, interviewee 14 caricatures the 
Chinese policy of non-interference: “the Chinese say, we'll build you a stadium, 
but we have nothing to do with whether the people going to the stadium will be 
slapped on their way” (14). Here it becomes clear that this form of non-
interference can even be argued to be a form of intervention because it implicitly 
supports the government not taking responsibility towards its people.  
This discussion of aid conditionality is not supposed to offer an answer 
whether or not or to what extent donors should interfere with political and human 
rights matters in recipient countries. If anything, it is supposed to depict certain 
dilemmas with regard to (non-)interference in development assistance. This 
difficulty and the debate on sovereignty interference go beyond the aim of this 
paper. Yet, for development theory and practice it is important to be aware of this 
sensitive matter and the inequality which can be expressed by interventions such 
as political conditions. The Accra Agenda for Action shows that international 
donors are aware of this dilemma. The document states that they “will continue to 
change the nature of conditionality to support ownership” e.g. by working “with 
developing countries to agree on a limited set of mutually agreed conditions based 
on national development strategies” (OECD 2008:20).  
The example of aid conditions for Malawi and the discussion about 
sovereignty and conditionality show that intervention is inherent in interstate 
relations. By only marginally discussing legal recognition, Honneth does not do 
justice to this complexity. In Honneth’s line of argumentation, political 
recognition is more important for achieving reconciliation and peaceful, equal 
interstate relations than legal recognition. Yet, through the empirical analysis and 
theoretical discussion it becomes explicit that the question of infringing 
sovereignty is more complex than the mere question of acceptance in the 
international community. Based on the importance of the discourse on sovereignty 
one can argue that it depends on multiple additional aspects if a state is accepted 
by the international community.  
Wolf (2008) also criticizes the narrowness of Honneth’s theory. To him it 
is important to differentiate between more than formally accepting the existence 
of a state on the one hand; and building up political relations on the other hand. 
Concerning the matter of sovereignty, it is not easy to determine if encroachments 
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on a states’ sovereignty belong to the political or to the legal sphere of 
recognition. There is a grey area at the interface of the two poles. 
Two conclusions can be drawn from the discussion of sovereignty. First, 
Honneth’s theory of recognition can become more fruitful for IR if discussing 
sovereignty interference more in depth. As depicted above, sovereignty is and has 
been a major issue in IR, even with regard to donor-recipient relations. Hence, one 
might e.g. consider establishing a third category in between legal and political 
recognition which deals with the grey area of sovereignty interference. Second, 
Honneth even undermines his own argument: by not paying close attention to the 
matter of sovereignty, he loses a chance to stress the importance of political 
recognition. If the goal of achieving sustainable, peaceful, equal interstate 
relations is at risk because of the sensitive matter of sovereignty interference; it 
can easily be argued that political recognition is even more relevant for interstate 
relations because it may even out the perceived injustice.  
Achievements and features 
This aspect of the theory of recognition allows for insights on the political, rather 
symbolic level of state interaction. The results of the discourse analysis point 
towards alternatives to the partnership approach and extend the concept of 
recognition. When it comes to achievements, two aspects are of great importance: 
internationalization and prestige. The dominant line of argumentation in the 
interviews is as follows: Malawi needs to build up prestige and international 
facilities in order gain greater international importance. This reverses the logic of 
Honneth’s statements. In the case analyzed, achievements need to be created to be 
recognizable, whereas according to Honneth achievements are already existent 
and a country simply longs for their international recognition. 
The projects of the package deal have a clear symbolic value. They 
represent progress in terms of internationalization and technology and are valued 
for their modernizing effect. In the context of development assistance, this 
observation sheds new light on donor-recipient relations. For the establishment of 
an equitable relationship, it may be necessary to some extent to follow the 
counterpart’s dominant understanding of development. As the discourse analysis 
shows, the modernization discourse plays an important role for the understanding 
of development in the Malawian context. This means that the focus on social 
development of the MDGs does not fully do justice to a modernization oriented 
understanding of development in Malawi. On the basis of the discourse analysis it 
can be argued that prestige and progress symbolized by buildings such as the 
conference center, allow for Malawians the feeling of increased recognition 
within the international community. The discourse on internationalization shows 
that in Malawian self-perception, Malawi needs to become more important within 
African and Global affairs. So to treat Malawi as an equal partner, donors may 
need to consider supporting Malawi in building up international stance; for a 
greater international stance means also a greater stance in bilateral relations. The 
Paris Declaration (OECD 2005:3) emphasizes alignment as one principle forming 
part of the partnership commitment. According to the Paris Declaration, alignment 
means that “[d]onors base their overall support on partner countries’ national 
development strategies, institutions and procedures” (OECD 2005:3). Hence, it is 
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reasonable to incorporate the dominant understanding of development in the 
respective place to realize the principle of alignment. In the case of Malawi this 
might mean to support projects not only because of their social or economic value 
but to be aware of the importance of aspects symbolizing progress and prestige, 
thus modernization and internationalization.
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The relevance of prestige and internationalization which is reflected in the 
discourse on achievements therefore underlines the importance of symbolic action 
in development. This is not to say that social development is not important but to 
state: In order to build up equitable relations in development processes, the 
dominant discourse in the country should be kept in mind in order to show respect 
and recognition for predominant values can be expressed. This can be of great 
support for the relationship and thus enable creating a real partnership.  
Humiliation  
When it comes to the discussion of humiliation, the aspects of vulnerability, 
power imbalance and transparency were discussed in the discourse analysis. With 
regard to the discussion on legal recognition, the discourses on vulnerability and 
power imbalance constitute two discourses which are interrelated with 
sovereignty: the fact that Malawi receives and depends on aid is a challenging 
matter for the country’s sovereignty. Hence, this aspect of humiliation has already 
been covered and does not need to be discussed in further detail. The matter of 
transparency, however, adds a new facet. The interviewees’ answers reflect 
uncertainty about the future outlook of the cooperation. Will there be demand for 
resources in order to pay back the debt? Will there be other constraints or 
conditions? Uncertainty and non-transparency arise if decisions are taken at the 
highest level of government and kept concealed not only from the great majority 
of the population but even from quite influential persons as most of the 
interviewees are. 
How does transparency relate to donor-recipient relations? Deliberative 
public reason is the key here. Obviously, in the case of Sino-Malawian relations, 
the vast majority of Malawians is left in the dark about the agreement’s terms and 
conditions. It is therefore not open to them whether or not Malawi has equal 
opportunities to influence the decisions (Barnes – Brown 2011:176). This means 
that they cannot influence the decision-making processes either, not even through 
parliamentary representatives. By analyzing Sino-Malawian relations from the 
humiliation perspective, it becomes clear that non-transparency is a hindrance for 
building up an equitable relationship. This fact underlines how relevant it is for 
donors (and recipient governments) to be open to all parts of society and include 
the parliament.  
Transparency towards and participation of citizens, however, play a role in 
debates on development already; as e.g. grassroots oriented approaches to 
development show (cf. Ziai 2009:184). By working with and supporting initiatives 
on the ground, persons affected are already included from the beginning. Thus, 
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the communication between donors and the affected is not mediated by the 
government. For this reason grassroots approaches may well be more transparent 
to citizens. However, this does not tackle transparency of governmental cooper-
ation which is the focus of this thesis. 
In development debates on transparency, relations between the European 
Union (EU) and the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Group of States have 
also played a role. They have been criticized for not being open about Economic 
Partnership Agreements (EPA). It is frequently argued that EPAs are more 
beneficial for the EU than for ACP states (cf. Gomes 2013). At the same time, 
scholars criticize that the agreements are not made fully accessible to the public 
(Burnett – Firoz 2005). So the matter of non-transparency towards citizens as a 
humiliating factor plays an important role in development assistance. Just like 
China, other donors may need to work on this issue in order to build up equitable 
relations. 
In sum, the discourse on non-transparency and reflections on transparency 
by development scholars point out that involvement of the whole population is of 
great importance to the population. The plea for participation is not very strong in 
the interviews; yet, many interviewees criticize the lack of information on the 
agreements. The seclusion of intergovernmental cooperation symbolizes to the 
population that partnership only concerns the governmental level but ignores the 
population. So for the constitution of a comprehensive sustainable partnership, the 
population may need to be informed closer.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
This thesis attempts an alternative approach to the analysis of Chinese 
engagement in African countries and to discuss the relevance of emerging donors’ 
strategies for debates on development. These debates are historically dominated 
by empirical insights from North-South cooperation. According to Zimmermann 
and Smith who argue that mutual learning and cooperative work among donors 
provide new opportunities (Zimmermann and Smith 2011), Sino-Malawian 
relations serve as an exemplary case for gaining new insights into ongoing 
approaches to partnership. 
This alternative approach is no attempt to proof loyalty to the Chinese 
regime: Various aspects of Sino-Malawian cooperation have been criticized based 
on the empirical findings of the study; mainly non-transparency is brought into 
focus. The goal of the research question is simply another one: It uses the package 
deal as a case for analyzing the role of recognition in donor-recipient relations. In 
the case of Sino-Malawian relations, aspects of recognition as well as humiliation 
play a role. 
To sum up this thesis’ results, empirical and theoretical aspects must be 
named. On an empirical level, this thesis provides explorative insights into Sino-
Malawian relations for scientific research on Sino-African relations. Moreover, 
the theory of recognition is applied empirically for research in International 
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Relations, namely development studies, which allows becoming aware of two 
main methodological problems: the difficulty to conceptualize the recognized 
group and the difficulty to operationalize recognition/humiliation. Since “vague 
does not mean unimportant” (Sawyer 2000: 17), I nevertheless use the concept of 
recognition for empirical research. Hence, this thesis provides a basis for other 
researchers to conduct more precise empirical research of the role of recognition 
in development assistance and IR.  
The discourse analysis reveals the need for amplification of Honneth’s 
concept of recognition: Honneth does not do justice to the concept of sovereignty 
in international relations. His approach considers formal recognition as a minor 
obstacle with regard to building peaceful interstate relations. Yet, Sino-Malawian 
cooperation shows that the formal recognition of a state’s sovereignty is not a 
simple process at all. There are subtle differences with regard to interfering into a 
state’s sovereignty and even open criticism can be viewed as interference. In order 
to increase the relevance of the theory of recognition for IR theory, Honneth 
should discuss legal recognition and the aspect of sovereignty in greater detail, 
e.g. by introducing a third category. 
Through application of the theory of recognition, several aspects emerge 
which shed light on sensitive issues in donor-recipient relations. Three main 
aspects can be named: visible progress, transparency and sovereignty.  
First, the discourses on prestige, internationalization and modernization 
draw attention to two matters. On the one hand, these discourses reveal the need 
to engage with the recipient countries’ views, narratives and discourses. The 
understanding of recipient countries’ criteria for evaluating development projects 
(e.g. modernization theory in Malawi’s case), enables an understanding of their 
perspectives and thus helps to improve the overall relationship. On the other hand, 
it becomes evident that it may be necessary to not simply understand development 
as poverty reduction. Symbolic aspects of development also matter: Prestige of 
the projects reflects progress in the eyes of most interviewees. Hence, these 
projects display additional symbolic value allowing for international recognition. 
By definition, the core business of development assistance rests to create “greater 
welfare for the majority of mankind” (Jönsson et al. 2012: 18); yet by considering 
symbolic aspects, the donor-recipient relation may be perceived as more equitable 
because they express political recognition of the recipients. 
Second, the discourse on transparency points out that involvement of the 
whole population is of paramount importance to the people – especially in terms 
of providing information. It symbolizes to the population that partnership does not 
only concern the governmental level but includes the population. Thus, involve-
ment of the whole population can help strengthen equitable relations. 
Third, the discourse on sovereignty spotlights the connection of a 
partnership approach to development and interference in recipient countries’ 
sovereignty. This discussion does already play a role in development debates. If 
practices such as imposing aid conditions take place, sovereignty becomes an 
important point of discussion for donor-recipient relations. However, since 
development cooperation – as all interstate relations – inevitably involves 
interference with sovereignty (c.f. Nye 2009), this is not an easy issue to solve. 
50 
 
Therefore, symbolic aspects of political recognition are very relevant because they 
allow building up a partnership even if sovereignty is infringed. 
On a theoretical level, this thesis combines the recognition perspective 
with debates on partnership in development. Shortcomings of both – the 
partnership approach as well as the theory of recognition – have become obvious. 
However, in general Honneth’s approach proves to be of value for development 
debates. It combines symbolic, procedural and identity related aspects with legal 
and material factors when analyzing IR. Hence, it provides a comprehensive 
perspective. The analysis shows that both aspects – redistribution and recognition 
– play a role in Sino-Malawian relations. Thus, recognition can serve as an 
analytical lens to guide such research. By analyzing donor-recipient relations from 
a recognition perspective, factors both hindering and fostering equitable donor-
recipient relations are revealed. At the same time, the theory of recognition can 
serve as a guiding principle in development assistance to work on equitable 
relations.   
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Executive summary  
 
This thesis analyzes Sino-Malawian cooperation on infrastructure projects from 
the perspective of Honneth’s theory of recognition in order to provide insights for 
a complementary understanding of the partnership approach in development 
debates.  
The impact of Sino-African relations on African countries has been in the 
focus of research in this area for some time. This thesis takes a different 
perspective tying in with current approaches in the field which focus on African 
perspectives and consider the possibility of mutual learning. Thus, the case is 
analyzed in order to shed new light on a field which has been dominated by 
empirical insights from North-South relations for a long time.  
The theoretical framework of the thesis combines theoretical insights from 
development studies with Honneth’s theory of recognition. The partnership 
approach is widely spread in development studies and most scholars agree on its 
instrumental value through the fostering of aid efficiency. Although normative 
questions hardly play a role in partnership debates, the concept has a moral 
component which “allows the impression that partnership is about transforming 
power relations in a positive and socially just fashion” (Barnes – Brown 2011: 
172). Honneth’s theory of recognition delivers a useful approach to reintroduce 
this normative aspect of partnership in the discussion. Honneth (2010) states and 
exemplifies that recognition and humiliation are relevant factors in IR. He 
differentiates between a legal and a political form of recognition. While legal 
recognition is about a state’s acceptance in the international community, political 
recognition is about the interaction of states whilst building up deeper relations. 
The latter takes place on multiple levels, including symbolic interaction and 
positive appraisal on the intrastate level, as well as narratives on experiences of 
humiliation within the population. According to Honneth, recognition serves as a 
guiding principle for interstate relations hence allowing the constitution of 
equitable, peaceful and sustainable relations. For this reason the theory of 
recognition provides good analytical lens to analyze donor-recipient relations. 
The data for the conducted analysis of Sino-Malawian relations derives 
from semi-structured expert interviews with representatives of local development 
NGOs and civil servants working on the cooperation or in the development sector. 
I conducted the interviews in early 2013.  Interviewees were questioned about 
their evaluation of the Sino-Malawian cooperation in general; with particular 
focus on their assessment of five main infrastructure projects decided upon in the 
initial agreement of the cooperation. 
Being inspired by Fairclough’s discourse analytical approach (CDA) I 
analyze the discourses relating to recognition in the interviews. I follow 
Fairclough’s three step approach. This includes a text based analysis, the analysis 
of interdiscursive aspects and the linkage to sociocultural practices and theories. 
There is, however, slight deviation from Fairclough’s approach in order to 
structure the analysis according to aspects of recognition and focusing on content 
related aspects of the texts.  
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The first part of the analysis focuses on the line of argumentation the 
interviewees use to ascribe meaning to different topics. Sovereignty, power 
imbalance, non-transparency as well as internationalization, prestige and 
modernization are the dominant discourses at stake. Based on a discussion of 
these discourses, several implications for the partnership approach as well as the 
theory of recognition itself can be determined which are discussed in the 
following parts of the analysis. If aiming for an equitable relationship, donors may 
need to take into account dominant discourses at stake (as in the case of Malawi 
modernization discourse). At the same time, non-transparency on relevant 
decisions in bilateral agreements seems to signalize that the population is not 
taken seriously. It symbolizes to the population that partnership mainly concerns 
the governmental level and excludes the population. Moreover, the sovereignty 
discourse points at the problem of infringing sovereignty by establishing 
conditions on aid. Conditions on aid are an obstacle when aiming for equitable 
donor-recipient relations. When imposed, other aspects of political recognition as 
mentioned above become even more important to strengthen the partnership. 
Based on the importance of the sovereignty discourse, I argue that Honneth’s 
theory of recognition can gain relevance within international relations theory if 
taking legal aspects of recognition further into consideration.  Overall, Honneth’s 
approach proves to be a helpful analytical perspective for discussing procedural 
and identity-related aspects of interstate relations, namely Sino-Malawian 
relations.   
53 
 
References 
Aid data, 2013a = Aid data: Open data for international development website, 
Tracking Chinese Development Finance to Africa, Kwacha Presidential Hotel, 
International Conference Centre and Presidential Villas, [Electronic] Available: 
http://aiddatachina.org/projects/776. Download date 2013-07-29. 
Aid data, 2013b = Aid data: Open data for international development website, 
Tracking Chinese Development Finance to Africa, Organization: Anhui 
Foreign Economic Construction Group Co., Ltd. (AFECC), [Electronic] 
Available: http://aiddatachina.org/organizations/1346. date 2013-07-29. 
Aid data, 2013c = Aid data: Open data for international development website, 
Tracking Chinese Development Finance to Africa, Construction of university 
of science and technology, [Electronic] Available:  
http://aiddatachina.org/projects/828. Download date 2013-07-29.  
Akude, John E., 2011. „Theorien der Entwicklungspolitik. Ein Überblick“. In: 
König, Julian – Thema, Johannes (eds.), 2011. Nachhaltigkeit in der 
Entwicklungszusammenarbeit. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag. 69-94. 
Alden, Chris, 2007. China in Africa: Partner, Competitor Or Hegemon? London, 
New York: Zed Books. 
Asche, Helmut – Schüller, Margot, 2008. „Chinas Engagement in Afrika – Chancen 
und Risiken für Entwicklung“. [Electronic] Available: http://www.giga-
hamburg.de/dl/download.php?d=/content/ias/pdf/studie_chinas_engagement_in
_afrika.pdf. Download date 2012-08-14. 
Ayers, Alison, 2012. “Beyond Myths, Lies and Stereotypes: The Political Economy 
of a ‘New Scramble for Africa’”. New Political Economy. 
DOI:10.1080/13563467.2012.678821.   
Bala, Arun – Joseph, George Gheverghese, 2007. “Indigenous knowledge and 
western science: the possibility of dialogue”. Race & Class. 49 (1): 39-61. 
Barnes, Amy – Brown, Garret Wallace, 2011. “The Idea of Partnership within the 
Millennium Development Goals: context, instrumentality and the normative 
demands of partnership”. Third World Quarterly. 32(1): 165–180.  
BMZ, 2011 = Website of the German Ministry of Development and Economic 
Cooperation, press release. „Regierungsverhandlungen mit Malawi 
abgeschlossen“. [Electronic] Available: 
http://www.bmz.de/de/presse/aktuelleMeldungen/2011/dezember/20111208_p
m_232_malawi/index.html. Download date 2013-08-06. 
Brautigam, Deborah, 2011a [2009]. The Dragon’s Gift. The Real Story of China in 
Africa. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press. 
Brautigam, Deborah, 2011b. “Chinese Development Aid in Africa.What, where, 
why, and how much?” In: Golley, Jane – Song, Ligang (eds.), 2011. Rising 
China. Global Challenges and Opportunities. [Electronic] Available: 
http://epress.anu.edu.au/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/whole3.pdf. Download 
date 2013-08-07. 203-222.  
Burnett, Patrick – Manji, Firoze, 2005. “Economic Partnership Agreements: 
territorial conquest by economic means?” Newspaper Article. Pambazuka 
News 216. [Electronic] Available: 
54 
 
http://www.pambazuka.org/en/publications/pz_epa.pdf. Download date 2013-
08-06. 
Cammack, Diana, 2012. “Malawi in crisis, 2011-12”. Review of African Political 
Economy. 39(132): 375-388. 
Center for Chinese Studies = website of the Center for Chinese Studies at 
Stellenbosch University, Projects. [Electronic] Available: 
http://www.ccs.org.za/?cat=65. Download date 2013-07-24. 
Chambers, Simone – Kopstein, Jeffrey, 2009. “Civil Society and the State”. In: 
Dryzek, John S. – Honig, Bonnie – Phillips, Anne (eds.), 2009. The Oxford 
Handbook of Political Theory. [Electronic]Available: 
http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com.ludwig.lub.lu.se/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/97
80199548439.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199548439-e-
20?rskey=qVr2BS&result=2. Download date 2013-08-05. 
Chidaushe, Moreblessings, 2007. “China’s Grand Re-Entrance into Africa – Mirage 
or Oasis?” In: Manji, Firoze – Marks, Stephen (eds.), 2007. African 
Perspectives on China in Africa. Cape Town, Nairobi, Oxford: Fahamu. 107-
118. 
Chouliaraki, Lilie – Fairclough, Norman, 1999. Discourse in Late Modernity. 
Rethinking Discourse Analysis. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.  
Conway, Dennis – Heynen, Nikolas, 2008. “Dependency Theories: From ECLA to 
André Gunder Frank and beyond”. In: Desai, Vandana – Potter, Robert (eds.), 
2008. The Companion to Development Studies. London: Hodder Education. 92-
95. 
Dederichs-Bain, Birgit – Martens, Jens – Ramm, Wolf-Christian, 2012. Die 
Wirklichkeit der Entwicklungspolitik 2012. Eine kritische Bestandsaufnahme 
der deutschen  Entwicklungszusammenarbeit. [Electronic] Available: 
http://www.tdh.de/fileadmin/user_upload/inhalte/10_Material/Wirklichkeit_der
_Entwicklungshilfe/2012-20-1_2/2012-
20_2_Wirklichkeit_der_Entwicklungspolitik.pdf. Download date 2013-07-27. 
Doty, Roxanne L., 1996. Imperial encounters: the politics of representation in 
North-South relations. Minneapolis, London: University of Minnesota Press.  
Dubosse, Nancy, 2010. “Chinese development assistance to Africa: aid, trade and 
debt”. In: Harneit-Sievers, Axel –  Marks, Stephen – Naidu, Sanusha (ed.), 
2010. Chinese and African Perspectives on China in Africa. Cape Town, 
Dakar, Nairobi and Oxford: Pambazuka Press.  
Elliot, Jennifer A., 2008. “Development and social welfare/human rights”. In: 
Desai, Vandana – Potter, Robert (eds.), 2008. The Companion to Development 
Studies. London: Hodder Education. 40-44. 
Epo 2012 = Entwicklungspolitik online website, Deutschland sagt Malawi 
umfangreiche Unterstützung zu. 2012-08-22. [Electronic] Available: 
http://www.epo.de/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=8691:de
utschland-sagt-malawi-umfangreiche-unterstuetzung-zu&catid=45&Itemid=90. 
Download date 2013-08-06. 
Eriksson Baaz, Maria, 2005. The Paternalism of Partnership. A Postcolonial 
Reading of Identity in Development Aid. London, New York: Zed Books. 
55 
 
Fagan, Craig, 2013. “Policy Brief. Looking Beyond 2015: A Role For 
Governance”. Transparency International. [Electronic] Available: 
http://issuu.com/transparencyinternational/docs/policy_brief._looking_beyond_
2015_a_role_for_gover/8?e=2496456/2190029 Download Date 2013-08-06. 
Fairclough, Norman, 2009. “Language and Globalization”. Semiotica.  173(1): 317-
342.  
Fairclough, Norman, 2010 [2009]. Critical Discours Analysis: The Critical Study of 
Language. Harlow: Pearson Education Limited.  
Flick, Uwe, 2007 [1995]. Qualitative Sozialforschung. Eine Einführung. Hamburg: 
Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verlag.  
Friedman, Thomas L., 2003. “The Humilitation Factor”. Newspaper Article. New 
York Times. 2003-11-09. [Electronic] Available: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/11/09/opinion/the-humiliation-factor.html. 
Download date 2013-06-21.  
Giovannetti, Giorgia – Sanfilippo, Marco, 2009. “Do Chinese Exports Crowd-out 
African Goods? An Econometric Analysis by Country and Sector”. Euopean 
Journal of Development Research. 21(4): 506-530. 
Glanville, Luke, 2011. “The antecedents of 'sovereignty as responsibility'”. 
European Journal of International Relations. 17(2): 233–255. 
Gomes, Patrick I., 2011. “Policy Arena. Reshaping an Asymmetrical Partnership: 
ACP-EU Relation from an ACP Perspective”. Journal of International 
Development. 25(5).714–726. 
Government of Malawi [Publication Date unkown]. The Public Sector Investment 
Programme (PSIP): 2010/11-2014/15. Building National Capacity for 
Sustained Growth and Development.  
Government of Malawi, 2011. Malawi Aid Atlas 2010/2011. [Electronic] 
Avaialable: https://www.google.de/search?output=search&sclient=psy-
ab&q=Malawi+Aid+Atlas&btnK=#MALAWI AID ATLAS 2010/11FY 
Download date 2013-03-09. 
Gross Stein, Janice, 2009. “Chapter 15: Psychological Explanations of International 
Conflict”. In: Simmons,  Beth A. – Risse, Thomas – Carlsnaes, Walter (eds.), 
2009. Handbook of International Relations. [Electronic] Available: 
http://knowledge.sagepub.com.ludwig.lub.lu.se/view/hdbk_intlrelations/n15.x
ml?rskey=fxescX&row=1. Download date 2013-07-27.  
Haacke, Jürgen, 2005. “The Frankfurt School and International Relations: On the 
Centrality of Recognition”. Review of International Studies. 31(1): 181-194. 
Hackenesch, Christine, 2013. “Aid Donor Meets Strategic Partner? The European 
Union’s and China’s Relations with Ethiopia”. Journal of Current Chinese 
Affairs. 42(1): 7-36. 
Hanusch, Marek, 2012. “African Perspectives on China-Africa: Modelling Popular 
Perceptions and their Economic and Political Determinants”. Oxford 
Development Studies. 40(4): 492–516. 
Harneit-Sievers, Axel –  Marks, Stephen – Naidu, Sanusha (eds.), 2010. Chinese 
and African Perspectives on China in Africa. Cape Town, Dakar, Nairobi and 
Oxford: Pambazuka Press.  
Honneth, Axel, 2010. Das Ich im Wir. Berlin: Suhrkamp Verlag. 
56 
 
Honneth, Axel, 1994. Kampf um Anerkennung. Zur moralischen Grammatik 
sozialer Konflikte. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag.  
Jackson, Patrick T., 2011. The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations. 
Philosophy of science and its implications for the study of world politics. 
Abingdon, New York: Routledge. 
Jönsson, Kristina – Jerneck, Anne – Arvidson, Malin, 2012. Politics and 
Development in a Globalised World: An Introduction. Lund: Studentlitteratur. 
Jorgenson, Marianne  – Phillips, Louise J. 2002. Discourse Analysis as Theory and 
Method. London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi: Sage Publications. 
Kragelund, Peter, 2009. “Part of the Disease or part of the Cure? Chinese 
Investments in the Zambian Mining and Construction Sectors”. Euorpean 
Journal of Development Research. 21(4): 644-661. 
Kvale, Steinar – Brinkmann Svend, 2009. Interviewing: Learning the Craft of 
Qualitative Research Interviewing. London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi: Sage 
Publications. 
Lee, Donna – Smith, Lee, 2010. “Small State Discourse in the International 
Political Economy”. Third World Quarterly. 31(7): 1091-1105. 
Lemos, Anabela – Ribeiro, Daniel, 2007. “Taking Ownership or Just Changing 
Owners?” In: Manji, Firoze – Marks, Stephen (eds.), 2007. African 
Perspectives on China in Africa. Cape Town, Nairobi, Oxford: Fahamu. 63-70. 
Lepenies, Phillipp H., 2009. „Lernen vom Besserwisser: Wissenstransfer in der 
‚Entwicklungshilfe‘ aus historischer Perspektive“. In: Büschel, Hubertus – 
Speich, Daniel (eds.), 2009. Entwicklungswelten. Globalgeschichte der 
Entwicklungszusammenarbeit. Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag. 33-60. 
Lin, Li (ed.), 2008. “Malawi confirms establishment of diplomatic relations with 
China”.  Newspaper article. 2008-01-14. [Electronic] Available: 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-01/14/content_7421771.htm. 
Download date 2013-07-29. 
Lindemann, Thomas, 2013. “The case for an empirical and socialpssychological 
study of recognition in international relations”. International Theory. 5(1): 
150-155. 
Loomba, Ania, 2005 [1998]. Colonialism/ Postcolonialism. Abingdon, New York: 
Routledge. 
malawi today, 2012. “Oil exploration on Lake Malawi turns fishy”. Newspaper 
article. 2012-07-09. [Electronic] Available: 
http://www.malawitoday.com/news/125729-oil-exploration-lake-malawi-oil-
turns-fishy. Download date 2013-07-29.  
Manji, Firoze – Marks, Stephen (eds.), 2007. African Perspectives on China in 
Africa. Cape Town, Nairobi, Oxford: Fahamu.  
Marcelo, Goncalo, 2013. “Recognition and Critical Theory today: An interview 
with Axel Honneth”. Philosophy & Social Criticism. 39(2): 209-221. 
Markell, Patchen, 2009. “Recognition and Redistribution”. In: Dryzek, John S. – 
Honig, Bonnie – Phillips, Anne (eds.), 2009. The Oxford Handbook of Political 
Theory. [Electronic] Available: 
http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com.ludwig.lub.lu.se/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/97
57 
 
80199548439.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199548439-e-
25?rskey=i6S3LJ&result=7. Download date 2007-07-27.  
McEwan, Cheryl, 2008. “Post-colonialism”. In: Desai, Vandana – Potter, Robert 
(eds.), 2008. The Companion to Development Studies. London: Hodder 
Education. 124-128. 
Meyer, Michael – Titscher, Stefan – Vetter, Eva – Wodak, Ruth (eds.), 2007 
[2000]. Methods of Text and Discourse Analysis. London, Thousand Oaks, 
New Delhi, Singapore: Sage Publications. 
Meyer, Michael, 2001. “Between theory, method, and politics: positioning of the 
approaches to CDA”. In: Meyer, Michael  – Wodak, Ruth (eds.), 2001. 
Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis.  [Electronic] Available: 
http://srmo.sagepub.com.ludwig.lub.lu.se/view/methods-of-critical-discourse-
analysis/d4.xml. Download date 2013-07-29. 
Mikkelsen, Britha, 2009 [1995]. Methods for Development and Research: A New 
Guide For Practitioners. New Delhi, Thousand Oaks, London: Sage 
Publications Inc.  
Mohan, Giles – Lampert, Ben, 2013. “Negotiating China: Reinserting African 
agency into China-Africa relations”. African Affairs. 112(446): 92-110. 
Molenaers, Nadia, 2012. “The Great Divide? Donor perceptions of budget support, 
eligibility and policy dialogue.” Third World Quarterly. 33(5): 791-806. 
Moyo, Dambisa, 2010 [2009]. Dead Aid: Why Aid Is Not Working And How There 
Is Another Way For Africa. London: Penguin Books. 
Moyo, Dambisa, 2012. Winner Take All: China’s Race for Resources and what it 
means for the World. New York, Philadelphia: Basic Books. 
Nye, Joseph S. Jr., 2009. Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to 
Theory and History. London, San Francisco, Boston: Pearson Longman. 
Obiorah, Ndubisi, 2007. “Who’s afraid of China in Africa? Towards an African 
Civil Society Perspective on China-Africa Relations”. In: Manji, Firoze – 
Marks, Stephen (eds.). African Perspectives on China in Africa. Cape Town, 
Nairobi, Oxford: Fahamu. 35-55.  
OECD, 2005 = Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development website, 
The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Accra Agenda for Action. 
http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/34428351.pdf. Download date 2013-07-
27. 1-14. 
OECD, 2008 = Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development website, 
The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Accra Agenda for Action. 
http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/34428351.pdf. Download date 2013-07-
27. 15-25. 
OECD, 2012 = Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development website, 
The DAC List of ODA Recipients. [Electronic] Available: 
http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/49483614.pdf. Download date 2013-07-25. 
Pieterse, Jan Nederveen, 2011, “Global rebalancing: crisis and the East-South turn”.  
Development and Change. 42( 1): 22-48. 
Rathbun, Brian C., 2009. “Interviewing and Qualitative Field Methods: Pragmatism 
and Practicalities”. In: Box-Steffensmeier, Janet M. – Brady, Henry E. – 
Collier, David (eds.), 2009. The Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology. 
58 
 
[Electronic] Available: 
http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com.ludwig.lub.lu.se/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/97
80199286546.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199286546-e-
29?rskey=vTwook&result=1. Download date 2013-07-29.  
Sawyer, Andrew, 2000. Realism and Social Science. London: Sage Publications. 
Schuetz, Janice, 2009. “Argumentation Theories”. In:  Foss, Karen A. – Littlejohn, 
Stephen W. (eds.), 2009. Encyclopedia of Communication Theory. [Electronic] 
Available: 
http://knowledge.sagepub.com.ludwig.lub.lu.se/view/communicationtheory/n1
7.xml?rskey=SRfFxu&row=21. Download date 2013-07-29.  
Simonis, Annette, 2008. „Geertz, Clifford“. In: Nünning, Ansgar (ed.), 2008. 
Metzler Lexikon. Literatur- und Kulturtheorie. Stuttgart, Weimar: Verlag J. B. 
Metzler. 241-242. 
Smith, Kimberly – Zimmermann, Felix, 2011. “More Actors, More Money, More 
Ideas For International Development Co-operation”. Journal of International 
Development. 23(5): 722–738. 
Sokhey, Sarah W., 2010. “Chapter 10: Political Development and Modernization”. 
In: Ishiyama, John T. – Breuning, Marijke (eds.), 2010. 21st Century Political 
Science: A Reference Handbook. [Electronic] Available: 
http://knowledge.sagepub.com.ludwig.lub.lu.se/view/21stcenturypolisci/n10.x
ml?rskey=7TE19z&row=17. Download date 2013-05-12 
Strange, Gerard, 2011. “China’s Post Listian Rise: Beyond Radical Globalisation 
Theory and the Political Economy of Neoliberal Hegemony”. New Political 
Economy. 16(5): 539-559. 
Streb, Christoph K., 2009. “Exploratory Case Study”. In: Mills, Albert J. – 
Durepos, Gabrielle – Wiebe, Elden (eds.), 2009. Encyclopedia of Case Study 
Research. [Electronic] Available: 
http://knowledge.sagepub.com/view/casestudy/n139.xml. Download date 
2013-07-29. 
Taylor, Charles, 1994. “The Politics of Recognition”. In: Taylor, Charles (ed.), 
1994. Multiculturalism: examining the politics of recognition. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 25-74. 
Taylor, Ian, 2009. China’s New Role in Africa. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.  
The World Bank, 2013a = The World Bank website, FAQs Millenium 
Development Goals. [Electronic] Available: 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTSITETOOLS/0,,content
MDK:20205641~menuPK:435312~pagePK:98400~piPK:98424~theSitePK:95
474,00.html. Download date 2013-07-27.  
Tran, Mark, 2011. “Britain suspends aid to Malawi” Newspaper article. The 
Guardian. 2011-07-14. [Electronic] Available: 
http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2011/jul/14/britain-suspends-
aid-to-malawi. Download date 2013-08-06. 
UN, 2013a = United Nations website, Millenium Development Goals. [Electronic] 
Available: http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/. Download date 2013-07-27.  
59 
 
UN, 2013b = United Nations website, Millenium Development Goals, Goal 8. 
[Electronic] Available:  http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/global.shtml. 
Download date 2013-07-27. 
UNDP, 2013 = United Nations Development Programme website, Malawi Country 
Profile: Human Development Indicators. [Electronic] Available: 
http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/MWI.html Download date 2013-
08-06. 
Villoria, Nelson B., 2009. “China’s Growth and the Agricultural Exports of Sub-
Saharan Southern Africa”. Euorpean Journal of Development Research. 21(4): 
531-550. 
Wolf, Reinhard, 2008. „Respekt. Ein unterschätzter Faktor in den internationalen 
Beziehungen“. Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen. 15(1): 5-42. 
World Bank, 2013b = The World Bank website, Data: Malawi, World Development 
Indicators. [Electronic] Available: http://data.worldbank.org/country/malawi. 
Download date 2013-08-06. 
Ziai, Aram, 2009. “’Development’: Projects, Power, and a Poststructuralist 
Perspective”.  Alternatives. 34(2):183-201 
Ziai, Aram, 2011. ”The Millenium Development Goals: back to the future?” Third 
World Quartely. 32(1): 27-43.. 
 
 
60 
 
Appendix 
 
Table 1a: Theoretical aspects of the analytical framework .................................................. 61 
Table 1b: Analytical framework ........................................................................................... 61 
Appendix 2: List of interviewees .......................................................................................... 62 
Table 3: Respected as an independent actor/ Malawi’s legal recognition  ........................... 64 
Table 4: Recognition of achievements and features ............................................................. 69 
Table 5: Humiliation: public opinion providing narratives about humiliation ..................... 78 
Table 6: Economic and social benefits of the package deal projects ................................... 82 
Appendix 7: Interview questions .......................................................................................... 85 
7.1. Interviews with representatives of local development NGOs .................................... 85 
7.2. Interviews with Malawian civil servants ................................................................... 86 
7.3. Interviews with employees at the Chinese embassy .................................................. 87 
7.4. Interviews with representatives of Chinese construction companies ........................ 87 
Appendix 8: Pictures of the package deal projects in Lilongwe .......................................... 89 
  
61 
 
Table 1a: Theoretical aspects of the analytical framework 
Discourse Analysis Critical reflections on the basis of the analysis 
Legal recognition Political recognition Recognition vs. redistribution 
Discourses on the 
state’s acceptance in 
the international 
community 
Discourses on 
achievements or 
features of the state 
Is striving for materialist goals and striving for 
recognition both taking place? 
 Discourses on the state 
as an independent actor 
Does the focus on recognition imply a trade-off 
so that the material needs of LDCs are at risk? 
 Discourses on 
humiliation 
Does recognition consolidate power imbalances? 
 
Table 1b: Analytical framework 
Analytical steps Topics to be covered 
Text based discourse analysis 
- Arguments and content 
- Discursive practice 
- Which are the dominant 
discourses and why? 
 
Formal recognition Deep recognition 
Discourses on the state’s 
acceptance in the inter-
national community 
Discourses on the state as an 
independent actor  
Discourses on achievements or features 
of the state 
Discourse on humiliation 
Theory driven discussion 
- Social practice of 
recognition and donor-
recipient relations 
Discussion of findings of the text based discourse analysis with 
regard to the theoretical framework of recognition and donor-
recipient relations 
Critical reflections on the basis of 
the analysis  
- Recognition vs. 
redistribution 
Is striving for materialist goals and striving for recognition both 
taking place? 
Does the focus on recognition imply a trade-off so that the material 
needs of LDCs are at risk? 
Does recognition consolidate power imbalances? 
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Appendix 2: List of interviewees 
 
Bold: Interviewees whose answers are relevant for the discourse analysis 
Normal: Interviewees who serve as informants 
1. Advisor at the Norwegian Embassy (interviewed in Lilongwe, 2013-02-13) 
2. Chief Legal Officer at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (interviewed in Lilongwe, 
2013-02-13) 
3. Legal Advisor at the Ministry of Trade (interviewed in Lilongwe, 2013-02-13) 
4. Project Manager at NGO working on the integration of people with disa¬
 bilities (interviewed in Lilongwe, 2013-02-14) 
5. Director of an NGO working on HIV and community health, rural area 
 Northern Region (interviewed in Lilongwe, 2013-02-15) 
6. Project Manager of an education project and Superior of a congregation 
(interviewed in a small town in the rural area of Malawi’s central region, 2013-
03-01) 
7. Principal Economist at the Ministry of Economic Planning and Development 
(interviewed in Lilongwe, 2013-03-05) 
8. Director of the Political Section and Press officer at the Chinese Embassy in Malawi 
(interviewed in Lilongwe, 2013-03-05) 
9. Director of NGO working on community development in Lilongwe (interviewed 
in Lilongwe, 2013-03-06) 
10. Manager for planning & Research at the Malawian Governmental 
Organization working on Investment and Trade (interviewed in Lilongwe, 
2013-03-06) 
11. Vice Chairman of the board, headmaster of an NGO working on education in 
Mzuzu, Northern Region (interviewed in Mzuzu, 2013-03-08) 
12. News Analyst & Senior Reporter of a regional branch of the newspaper the 
Nation (interviewed in Mzuzu, 2013-03-08) 
13. Coordinator at NGO working on microloans in Mzuzu (interviewed in Mzuzu, 
2013-03-08) 
14. Programme Manager at NGO working on Children Rights in Mzuzu 
(interviewed in Mzuzu, 2013-03-08) 
15. Anonymous interviewee 
16. Deputy Project Manager at the construction company building the Malawi 
International Conference Center and Business Hotel (Shanghai Construction Group 
General Company) (interviewed in Lilongwe, 2013-03-11) 
17. Chief Economist in the Monitoring and Evaluation division of the Ministry of 
Economic Planning and development (interviewed in Lilongwe, 2013-03-14) 
18. Director of the Debt and Aid Division of the Ministry of Finance (interviewed in 
Lilongwe, 2013-03-15) 
19. Assistant Director of the Debt and Aid Division, Ministry of Finance, Chinese 
Desk (interviewed in Lilongwe, 2013-03-15) 
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20. Communications, Research and Advocacy officer at an NGO working on slum 
upgrading, sanitation and housing in Blantyre and Lilongwe (interviewed in 
Lilongwe, 2013-03-15) 
21. Employee in the Monitoring and Evaluation division of the Ministry of 
 Economic Planning and Development (interviewed in Lilongwe, 2013-03-14) 
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Table 3: Respected as an independent actor/ Malawi’s legal recognition by 
the international community 
 
Different discourses and matching 
statements 
Interviewee (number and position) 
 
No aid conditionality 
 
 
“Tying aid to certain conditions has been very 
difficult for African countries” (2) 
 
“The relation is that the Chinese they don't 
have strings the west, they'll give you strings, 
whereby China they don't give you strings. 
When you say 'Do this' they will do it fully 
without any string … they don't interfere into 
politics-... They don't say: You look first at 
the issues of corruption, adress this do that. 
China doesn't do this. They say it's part of the 
partnership” (5) 
 
“I congratulate Chinese government because 
they don't condition us. … We feel they are 
doing it freely. They have that love to do it, to 
help.” (6) 
 
“If there is an advantage to their support that 
remains the single advantage, the main 
advantage. They don't have any conditions 
attached to it. Eh but even though they don't 
have any condition attached to it – sometimes 
if a country would put a condition, then you 
know … what this is all about. But what we 
don't know. There is no condition, but why?” 
(9) 
 
 “These other donors’ conditions – ah – it’s 
too many conditions. But China when it's 
giving –  ah there are not many conditions. 
The conditions are not tough as other 
countries’.” (11) 
 
“And when others countries, donors, stopped 
assisting Malawi, China was there assisting 
us. [...] So really – that's a friend in need.” 
- Interviewee no. 2 (Chief Legal Officer at 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) 
 
- Interviewee no. 5 (Director of an NGO 
working on HIV and community health)  
 
- Interviewee no. 6 (Project Manager of an 
education project and Superior of a 
congregation) 
 
- Interviewee no. 9  (Director of NGO 
working on community development)  
 
- Interviewee no. 11 (Vice Chairman of the 
board, headmaster of an NGO working on 
education) 
 
- Interviewee no. 12 (News Analyst & 
Senior Reporter newspaper the Nation)  
 
- Interviewee no. 13 (Coordinator at NGO 
working on microloans) 
 
- Interviewee no. 14 (Programme Manager 
at NGO working on Children Rights) 
 
- Interviewee no. 17 (Chief Economist in 
the Monitoring and Evaluation division of 
the Ministry of Economic Planning and 
development) 
 
- Interviewee no. 18 (Director of the Debt 
and Aid Division of the Ministry of 
Finance) 
 
- Interviewee no. 19 (Assistant Director of 
the Debt and Aid Division, Ministry of 
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(11) 
 
“Aid from the west and aid from China – 
most governments prefer aid from China. The 
reason is that aid from the west has got 
conditions while aid from China doesn't have 
those conditions.” (12) 
 
“So I think if we end the relationship with 
China, Malawi will suffer a lot because it will 
not be easy to be getting money from the 
west.” (12) 
 
“When someone is struggling, you want to 
empower the same person, at the same time 
you're asking for difficult conditions, it may 
be difficult.” (13) 
 
“The Chinese say, we'll build you a stadium. 
But we have nothing to do with whether the 
people going to the stadium will be slapped 
on their way going to the stadium” (14) 
 
“British would say: people [...] should 
understand their rights, should not be 
opressed, should have freedom to talk” (14) 
 
“The fact that the Chinese do not give 
conditions, does not show that it is positive or 
it is good for Malawians. And the fact that the 
British give conditions does also not show 
that the British are bad to Malawians.” (14) 
 
“There are no conditionalities to the 
relationship. Usually with other donors 
obviously there will be conditions. Don't do 
this – or do this if you want to get this. That's 
the major difference. China they do not 
demand any conditions for their aid.” (17) 
 
“It means they are giving you freedom. They 
are not tying you down.” (17) 
 
 “So this aid with no conditions can … maybe 
aid the developing country more.” (17) 
 
“Both economically and politically, I have 
Finance, Chinese Desk) 
 
- Interviewee no. 20 (Communications, 
Research and Advocacy officer at an 
NGO working on slum upgrading, 
sanitation and housing) 
 
- Interviewee no. 21 (Employee in the 
Monitoring and Evaluation division of the 
Ministry of Economic Planning and 
Development) 
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never seen a condition where they would say 
unless you have done abc you cannot be to 
lend from us.” (19) 
 
“I think that's where the Chinese are beating 
the North. They don't like dictating. Africa 
now is looking to the east because they are 
very flexible […] the north would have told 
us something different – that we don't need 
the university, we need hospitals. […] People 
see we are malnourished and very sick” (20) 
 
“I think that [the Chinese] are investing on 
your priorities” (20) 
 
“China and Malawi relations it's strong 
because you know it's like there are not many 
conditionalities so it's simplified a little bit. 
There are a lot of short cuts, they don't link it 
to human rights. It's ususally because those 
are the thorny areas. They just give it, they 
don't care. So their relationship with Malawi 
is a little bit simplified and straight forward. 
There are not a lot of conditions.” (21) 
 
 
Support of projects without funding from 
western donors 
 
 
  
“China is pretty much focused on first level 
cooperation. Infrastructure development and 
very visible changes or signs of the 
cooperation. Unlike western countries – 
although they have a role of course, for 
example the European Union in … they 
playing a big role in infrastructure 
development, they go a little further to focus 
on other types of cooperation. For example 
relating it to governance, ehm. Private sector 
development and so forth.” (3) 
 
“Within a very short time, here we are, we 
see physically the buildings. We have had 
other development partners for over 40 years 
but there's nothing to show.” (4) 
 
 
- Interviewee no. 3 (Legal Advisor on 
Business Environment at the Ministry of 
Trade)  
 
- Interviewee no. 4 (Project Manager at 
NGO working on the integration of 
people with disabilities) 
 
- Interviewee no. 7 (Principal Economist at 
the Ministry of Economic Planning and 
Development) 
 
- Interviewee no. 12 (News Analyst & 
Senior Reporter newspaper the Nation)  
 
- Interviewee no. 18 (Director of the Debt 
and Aid Division of the Ministry of 
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“Then you say, okay if you are giving us aid 
without preconditions, then that's what we 
need. Why, because that is in line somehow – 
somehow in line, I think with the Paris 
declaration. Because what you are saying is 
every country has to develop its own strategy 
and the donors have to be there simply to 
support, what the recipient country feels is 
good for them.” (7) 
 
“All these years,  I don't know what was 
happening. But it had to take China to do all 
that. Now China has built all that, it means 
people are able to congregate and discuss.” 
(12) 
 
“The main comparative advantage that I see 
with the Chinese aid is that the Chinese are 
willing to go into areas where very few other 
cooperate partners are willing to go and that 
is in infrastructure. I don’t think you can 
easily convince most of our cooperate 
partners to come and construct a stadium for 
us. I don't think you can easily convince most 
of our cooperate partners, traditional donors, 
to construct these buildings, so the 
parliament, the conference centre and so 
forth. So the Chinese are coming in to 
address those resources which would have 
otherwise been difficult for us to mobilize 
resources. So I think that's the main 
comparative advantage that I see with the 
Chinese” (18) 
 
 
Finance) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Malawian government is able to take 
independent decisions 
 
 
 
“Except for aid from Europe, I think, they 
also take into account the Paris Declaration 
where the issue of a country having its own 
strategy is a major issue. […] So aid for 
Malawi has to be aligned to the Malawi 
Growth and development strategy. [….] for 
China I'm not quite sure if the Paris 
 
- Interviewee no. 7 (Principal Economist at 
the Ministry of Economic Planning and 
Development) 
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declaration has played a major role.” 
(7) 
 
“Then you say, okay if you are giving us aid 
without preconditions, then that's what we 
need. Why, because that is in line somehow – 
somehow in line, I think with the Paris 
declaration. Because what you are saying is 
every country has to develop its own strategy 
and the donors have to be there simply to 
support, what the recipient country feels is 
good for them.” (7) 
 
 
Launch of diplomatic relations 
 
 
 
“It [the cooperation] came like an IR thing” 
when Malawi ended relations with Taiwan  
(2) 
 
“So that's how they build the good image of 
their country. They build a lot of things and 
we have a lot of them.” (9) 
 
“For the moment that we have established 
diplomatic relations in 2008, they have made 
sure that we feel their presence that they are 
here as a brother.” (10) 
 
“I'm sure you're already aware of the 
background that originally Malawi was 
cooperating with the Republic of China up to 
2008” (18) 
 
“When we switched we quickly agreed to the 
program of support” (18) 
 
- Interviewee no. 2 (Chief Legal Officer at 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) 
 
- Interviewee no. 9  (Director of NGO 
working on community development)  
 
- Interviewee no. 10 (Manager for planning 
& Research at the Malawian 
Governmental Organization working on 
Investment and Trade) 
 
- Interviewee no. 18 (Director of the Debt 
and Aid Division of the Ministry of 
Finance) 
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Table 4: Recognition of achievements and features 
 
Different discourses and matching 
statements 
Interviewee (number and position) 
 
… achievements of progress and modernization 
 
 
Efficency 
…created by projects 
- less time to travel from Karonga to Chitipa (3, 
4, 5, 11, 14, 17) 
“Chitipa was a cut-off district. It was almost in-
accessible” (3) 
 “11 hours to 2,5 hours: is that not 
development?” (4) 
“So you know you can do a lot in 5 hours. But 
only use it for travelling? [..] [Because of the 
road], you now still have 4 hours in which  you 
can use it productively” (17) 
- moving agriculture products is now possible 
(nos. 4, 17) 
… of the projects’ implementation 
“We are only 2 or 3 years in a relationship with 
China. But look what has been done” (4) 
 “What I have heard is that the Malawi-Chinese 
cooperation is the best ever because within a very 
short time, here we are, we see physically the 
buildings.” (4) 
 “I can see that it's moving at very fast pace” (18) 
 “The implementation is faster as compared with 
other donors” (19) 
 
 
 
- Interviewee no. 3 (Legal Advisor on 
Business Environment at the Ministry of 
Trade) 
 
- Interviewee no. 4 (Project Manager at NGO 
working on the integration of people with 
disabilities) 
 
- Interviewee no. 5 (Director of an NGO 
working on HIV and community health)  
 
- Interviewee no. 11 (Vice Chairman of the 
board, headmaster of an NGO working on 
education) 
 
- Interviewee no. 14 (Programme Manager at 
NGO working on Children Rights) 
 
- Interviewee no. 17 (Chief Economist in 
theMonitoring and Evaluation division of 
the Ministry of Economic Planning and 
development) 
 
- Interviewee no. 18 (Director of the Debt and 
Aid Division of the Ministry of Finance) 
 
- Interviewee no. 19 (Assistant Director of the 
Debt and Aid Division, Ministry of Finance, 
Chinese Desk) 
 
 
Progress 
“before you could see a park and a botanical area 
(where the parliament is)” (2)  
 
- Interviewee 2 (Chief Legal Officer at the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs) 
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“it wasn't anything and then when you compare 
the other infrastructures we have in Lilongwe, 
you see that these are the changes, that at least 
here we have modern structures as compared to 
the ones just across the street.” (2) 
“But we are very proud about it on the positive 
part because it has added something to Malawi. 
Something we never had before” (6) 
 “We cannot live the past life we used to live. 
Things are changing nowadays. We need to have 
something also.” (6) 
“Place looks really clean” (6) 
“That's basically what we do because by the end 
of the day we want to see Malawi go forward” 
(7) 
“We want to move out from where we are to the 
next level” (10) 
“In terms of visibility they (the buildings) have 
helped to change the face of Malawi” (12) 
Technological change 
“storey buildings... just as you have there in 
Germany … for the sake of landscape” (6)  
“They have built is so modern technology. It's 
high, it's good” (11) 
Economic growth 
“football can be a career” (4) 
“people [in Chitipa] are now able to sell their 
products” (11) 
“People are able to invest in Chitipa now” (13) 
International trade 
“Malawi government can generate a lot of 
foreign exchange out of the buildings” (4) 
 
 
- Interviewee no. 4 (Project Manager at NGO 
working on the integration of people with 
disabilities) 
 
- Interviewee no. 6 (Project Manager of an 
education project and Superior of a 
congregation) 
 
- Interviewee no. 7 (Principal Economist at 
the Ministry of Economic Planning  
 
- Interviewee no. 10 (Manager for planning & 
Research at a Malawian Governmental 
Organization working on Investment and 
Trade) 
 
- Interviewee no. 11 (Vice Chairman of the 
board, headmaster of an NGO working on 
education) 
 
- Interviewee no. 12 (News Analyst & Senior 
Reporter newspaper the Nation) 
 
- Interviewee no. 13 (Coordinator at NGO 
working on microloans) 
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Sub-discourse: dependency 
 
“The conference center right now is not useful. 
Right now don't use it.... So I think, it came 
earlier just to beautify the city” (9) 
 
“If they were bringing in industrialization when 
you have machines, that would create 
employment for the people but these 
developments, they are just done” (9) 
 
 
 
- Interviewee no. 9  (Director of NGO 
working on community development) 
Sub-discourse: cheap products and low quality 
 
 “The only benefit that I would assume is, you 
see, that Chinese projects are always cheap.” (2) 
 
“ Everytime you talk of Chinese items, people 
have the impression that it’s low quality, it’s 
short leave, it’s not durable but if we talk of the 
UK […] you say this is durable” (4) 
 
“It’s symbolic to the people who are coming 
because, for example the hotel, it’s of good 
quality for international people, tourism. To stay 
there, no local person can manage.” (5) 
 
“I’m very keen on following developments 
which are happening in China. And recently, 
maybe 2012 and 2013, a lot of roads and 
highways, bridges, have collapsed in China. And 
this means of course a lot of accidents. This 
means that what they are doing is of cheap 
quality of low quality. And the thing we have 
started just now with the cooperation, they look 
good but we don’t know about the quality. And 
we don’t know in the long run, how the road will 
be after three years, how will the hotel be after 
three years – will it not collapse? I think, they are 
collapsing the country. […] Our assumption is 
that maybe they have given us things of bad 
quality.” (5) 
 
“When they were building the parliament on the 
positive side I would say we feel good, 
appreciate, that there is that relationship. […] But 
most of the Malawians were questioning to say – 
 
 
- Interviewee 2 (Chief Legal Officer at the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs) 
 
- Interviewee no. 4 (Project Manager at NGO 
working on the integration of people with 
disabilities) 
 
- Interviewee no. 5 (Director of an NGO 
working on HIV and community health)  
 
- Interviewee no. 6 (Project Manager of an 
education project and Superior of a 
congregation) 
 
- Interviewee 7 (Principal Economist at the 
Ministry of Economic Planning and 
Development (Public Sector Investment 
Program).  
 
- Interviewee no. 20 (Communications, 
Research and Advocacy officer at an NGO 
working on slum upgrading, sanitation and 
housing) 
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but is it going to be strong? Is it not going to fall 
down just as we are having with these other thing 
like electricity appliances, clothes … How about 
with the parliament – is it not going to be the 
same?” (6) 
 
“There are people in Malawi that feel that 
Chinese products are not durable. Of course you 
have a new product but it doesn’t last long. So 
you have all these perceptions from different 
sections of society. But others have argued, they 
say, of course they are not durable but you still 
have a new thing.” (7) 
 
“The parliament building […] – already the 
ceiling was falling off” (20) 
 
“You know the word China […] in Malawi, if 
you say China, what you mean is something that 
doesn’t last long.” (20) 
 
Sub-discourse: rural poverty 
 
“It’s quite difficult to answer. You know, the 
majority of Malawians live in the rural area. If 
the developments are only taking place in town, 
obviously you are only targeting 20% of the 
population. So it will be very difficult for the 
majority of the people to appreciate things like 
those.” (2) 
 
“Maybe some would say that you start with 
developments in towns and then you go out 
because that's where the money comes from 
anyways.” (2) 
 
“They needed to boost more agriculture in the 
rural masses” (9) 
 
“There’s a very big gap with what’s happening 
there and how people are suffering. […] It shows 
as if we were somewhere but we are very far. 
[…]It’s not in line with the poverty levels” (9) 
 
“The politicians … and the Chinese are 
benefiting” (9) 
 
 
- Interviewee 2 (Chief Legal Officer at the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs) 
 
- Interviewee no. 5 (Director of an NGO 
working on HIV and community health)  
 
- Interviewee no. 9  (Director of NGO 
working on community development) 
 
- Interviewee no. 11 (Vice Chairman of the 
board, headmaster of an NGO working on 
education) 
 
- Interviewee no. 13 (Coordinator at NGO 
working on microloans) 
 
- Interviewee no. 14 (Programme Manager at 
NGO working on Children Rights) 
 
- Interviewee no. 20 (Communications, 
Research and Advocacy officer at an NGO 
working on slum upgrading, sanitation and 
housing) 
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“If they can come to assist us […] in terms of 
agriculture, it will help us. If they can also 
change their focus. As I’m telling you, food 
security is also a problem” (11)  
 
“This road has really empowered the people in 
Malawi […]. People are able to invest in Chitipa 
now” (13) 
 
“What I’m saying: The Chinese are benefiting 
most” (14) 
 
“Development has to start from the family and 
then grow to common persons livelihood”  (20) 
 
 
 
 
… achievements of internationalization 
 
 
New opportunities for international tourism 
 
“investment in tourism infrastructure” (4) 
 
tourism is fostered (12) 
 
“The conference center attracts tourists” (13) 
 
“We believe as government that tourism can 
drive the country's development process. The 
only problem is that it's still growing and it needs 
a lot of support. [..] The hotel contributes to 
tourism” (17) 
 
 
 
 
- Interviewee no. 3 (Legal Advisor on 
Business Environment at the Ministry of 
Trade) 
 
- Interviewee no. 12 (News Analyst & Senior 
Reporter newspaper the Nation) 
 
- Interviewee no. 13 (Coordinator at NGO 
working on microloans) 
 
- Interviewee no. 17 (Chief Economist in 
theMonitoring and Evaluation division of 
the Ministry of Economic Planning and 
development) 
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Now possible to hold international conferences 
 
“Malawi will now be able to host international 
meetings at that conference center, SADC 
meetings in that conference center” (4)  
 
“international conferences are now possible” (5) 
 
“So Malawi will be recognized as a place where 
you can have meetings” (12) 
 
“the conference center has international 
standards” (13) 
 
“Now we can be able to host international events 
… SADC meetings” (14) 
 
“In the past it has not been possible to have the 
summit of the African Union in the country 
because it was not possible to accommodate 
people” (17) 
 
 “only country in the region which did not have a 
proper proper international conference center but 
now we do have one and we can now host 
international meetings, we can now host head of 
states” (18) 
 
 
- Interviewee no. 4 (Project Manager at NGO 
working on the integration of people with 
disabilities) 
 
- Interviewee no. 5 (Director of an NGO 
working on HIV and community health)  
 
- Interviewee no. 12 (News Analyst & Senior 
Reporter newspaper the Nation) 
 
- Interviewee no. 13 (Coordinator at NGO 
working on microloans) 
 
- Interviewee no. 14 (Programme Manager at 
NGO working on Children Rights) 
 
- Interviewee no. 17 (Chief Economist in 
Monitoring and Evaluation division of the 
Ministry of Economic Planning and 
development) 
 
- Interviewee no. 18 (Director of the Debt and 
Aid Division of the Ministry of Finance) 
International sports 
 
“international games” (13) 
 
“international tournaments” (14) 
 
 “Stadium of international standards” (18) 
 
 
 
- Interviewee no. 13 (Coordinator at NGO 
working on microloans) 
 
- Interviewee no. 14 (Programme Manager at 
NGO working on Children Rights) 
 
- Interviewee no. 18 (Director of the Debt and 
Aid Division of the Ministry of Finance) 
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...achievements of prestige 
 
 
Beauty and magnificence of the parliament 
buiding and conference centre 
 
“before you could see a park and a botanical area 
(where the parliament is)” (2) 
 
“it wasn't anything and then when you compare 
the other infrastructures we have in Lilongwe, 
you see that these are the changes, that at least 
here we have modern structures as compared to 
the ones just across the street.” (2) 
 
“It is something that our politicans like a lot: 
having visible signs of change. So it serves the 
politicans quite well as well.” (3) 
 
“[...] that parliament building. It was wonderful, 
very very magnificent building and I was very 
happy to be there.” (4) 
 
“What they have constructed, they are beautiful 
things and they are making our cities more 
beautiful” (5) 
 
“But we are very proud about it on the positive 
part because it has added something to Malawi. 
Something we never had before” (6) 
 
“one of the landmarks in the country in the 
future” (9) 
 
“To me, beauty coming before time, it's not 
beauty” (9) 
 
“So it has really beautified the city.” (9) 
 
“The landscape has changed. The scenery has 
changed” (10) 
 
“They are adding on beauty. It's beautifying the 
country now. It's beautiful, it's nice.” (11) 
 
 
 
 
 
- Interviewee no. 2 (Chief Legal Officer at the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs) 
 
- Interviewee no. 3 (Legal Advisor on 
Business Environment at the Ministry of 
Trade) 
 
- Interviewee no. 4 (Project Manager at NGO 
working on the integration of people with 
disabilities) 
 
- Interviewee no. 5 (Director of an NGO 
working on HIV and community health)  
 
- Interviewee no. 6 (Project Manager of an 
education project and Superior of a 
congregation) 
 
- Interviewee no. 9  (Director of NGO 
working on community development) 
 
- Interviewee no. 11 (Vice Chairman of the 
board, headmaster of an NGO working on 
education) 
 
- Interviewee no. 12 (News Analyst & Senior 
Reporter newspaper the Nation)  
 
- Interviewee no. 14 (Programme Manager at 
NGO working on Children Rights) 
 
- Interviewee no. 20 (Communications, 
Research and Advocacy officer at an NGO 
working on slum upgrading, sanitation and 
housing) 
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“In terms of visibility they (the buildings) have 
helped to change the face of Malawi” (12) 
 
“If you look at the University of Chiolo, Ndata, 
you couldn't believe to see the structure. It's just 
magnificent” (12) 
 
“The magnificent parliament building”(14) 
“centre of beauty or attraction” (14) 
 
“gives people courage that these are the things 
we are supposed to have”( 14) 
 
“The beauty will give, will encourage the people 
to look at things in a positive way […] or to be 
associated with good things.”(no. 14) 
 
“Asthetically they are superb but functionally, I 
think they are also good of course, but I think … 
I mean the parliament building … already there 
was a ceiling that was falling off” (20) 
  
 
Capital has status symbols now 
 
“parliament is a symbol of importance” (5) 
 
“In terms of the capital  (in Africa) Malawi is 
almost the last in terms of beauty. So when the 
Chinese have built the new things people are 
happy to say now: our capital is coming up! We 
want to be compared with other countries.” (11) 
 
“Yeah because we are able today to say 'this is 
our capital city' when someone comes in a 
foreign country […] Automatically it is already 
uplifting the standards of Malawi as a whole as 
well as out there. People, at the end of the day 
will be able to know that there is Malawi on the 
world map as well as in Africa.” (13) 
 
“Lilongwe is our capital. So,if our capital city is 
seen beautiful, it's the pride of the country” (13) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- Interviewee no. 5 (Director of an NGO 
working on HIV and community health)  
 
- Interviewee no. 10 (Manager for planning & 
Research at the Malawian Governmental 
Organization working on Investment and 
Trade) 
 
- Interviewee no. 11 (Vice Chairman of the 
board, headmaster of an NGO working on 
education) 
 
- Interviewee no. 13 (Coordinator at NGO 
working on microloans) 
 
- Interviewee no. 20 (Communications, 
Research and Advocacy officer at an NGO 
working on slum upgrading, sanitation and 
housing) 
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“I think the two on the presidential, the 
conference Chinese. It is quite dignifying these 
days at least when you go to the city center 
because that's the city center. In the past there 
was actually nothing to point that this is it. But I 
think this has actualy changed the outlook of the 
city.” (20) 
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Table 5: Humiliation: public opinion providing narratives about 
experiences of humiliation 
 
 
… small country/ LDC = non-powerful actor 
 
 
“Malawi on its own was never going to achieve 
such kind of developments withing such a short 
period of time” (4) 
 
“Malawi on it's own cannot pass through all 
these stages up to industrialization stage without 
any assistance outside. It's not possible.” (4)  
 
“We need such structures in Malawi of which it 
is not easy to have such structures because of our 
economy in Malawi” (6) 
 
 “But for us, all what we are saying is: We have 
the following debts which have to be filled. 
Whoever donor is available to fill this gap, is 
very much welcome in Malawi.” (7) 
 
“In a case where you are a country that is so 
much looking for aid you have a case where 
there are no preconditions, then it's is good for 
you.” (7) 
 
“Malawians now they can afford to put on a shoe 
thanks to China – we can put on a dress like this, 
thanks to China” (11) 
 
“we expect them to empower us. Because I don't 
believe in that – you give me a fish, but why 
don't you teach me how to fish?” (11) 
 
“Malawi is a poor country. Most of the projects 
China has carried out could not have been done. 
Cause there is no money to do that” (12) 
 “People, at the end of the day will be able to 
know that there is Malawi on the world map as 
well as in Africa. Because previously people 
could be asking “Where exactliy is Malawi?” 
This time, I'm sure people will be able to say: 
this part of Africa.” (13) 
 
- Interviewee no. 4 (Project Manager at NGO 
working on the integration of people with 
disabilities) 
 
- Interviewee no. 6 (Project Manager of an 
education project and Superior of a 
congregation) 
 
- Interviewee no. 7 (Principal Economist at 
the Ministry of Economic Planning and 
Development) 
 
- Interviewee no. 11 (Vice Chairman of  the 
board, headmaster of an NGO  working on 
education) 
 
-  Interviewee no. 12 (News Analyst & Senior 
Reporter newspaper the Nation  
 
- Interviewee no. 13 (Coordinator at NGO 
working on microloans) 
 
- Interviewee no. 14 (Programme  Manager at 
NGO working on Children Rights)  
 
- Interviewee no. 17 (Chief Economist in the 
Monitoring and Evaluation division of the 
Ministry of Economic Planning and 
development) 
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“There’s many Chinese product, how can a small 
Malawian business person grow?” (14) 
 
“Very few people can even answer to the 
questions you were asking me because very few 
people have very few information about current 
affaires are in their own country” (14) 
 
“The idea is that we want to develop to a certain 
level where we can begin to reduce dependence 
on the donors” (17) 
 
 “Malawi being an LDC we only borrow on 
concessional terms, so when we do our 
calculations using the IMF template in terms of 
calculating the grant element”(18)  
 
 
 
 
…nontransparent processes 
 
 
Nontransparent processes: what are they 
getting from us? 
 
“what is it these guys are getting from us … It 
could be people at top government level are 
aware of that but I'm not” (2) [participated in 
talks about parliament, conference 
center...principal for all agreements and 
treaties...]  
 
“it's not good [there are no preconditions,] china 
in ten years, they'll also come with their own 
strings” (5) 
 
“Citizen they fear what will result out of what is 
happening” (9) 
 
“Eh but even though they don't have any 
condition attached to it – sometimes if a country 
would put a condition, then you know … what 
this is all about. But what we don't know.” (9) 
 
“Sometimes the agreement between the two 
countries, like Malawians, most of Malawians 
they are not aware of the terms. The people are  
 
 
 
- Interviewee no. 2 (Chief Legal Officer at the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs) 
 
- Interviewee no. 5 (Director of an NGO 
working on HIV and community health) 
 
- Interviewee no. 9 (Director of NGO 
working on community development) 
 
- Interviewee no. 11 (Vice Chairman of  the 
board, headmaster of an NGO  working on 
education) 
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not aware of it. So sometimes people are reacting 
because they don't know what is the content of 
the agreement. I hope that if Malawi is signing a 
memorandum of understanding for example, the 
cooperation, full parliament, full what, the 
masses also should know what to expect from 
China. …  Sometimes they are kept somewhere 
and the majority of the people have no access. If 
we have access it's through our own ways of 
getting information. At least it should be people 
driven. …. This is a democracy. People should 
know about the cooperation, what China is to 
assist Malawi and then we can come up with 
suggestions.” (11) 
 
“Transparency is not there” (11) 
 
 
Lack of public participation of society/ citizens 
 
“but I don't know what agreement between the 
government and those Chinese people.“ (6)  
 
“Because still now, many Malawians don't know 
– what is a grant among the projects and which 
one is a loan. Because the executive does that 
and there is no proper communication to the 
local level, to the ground – so everyone is aware. 
So the impact is that we might end up with a lot 
of infrastructure that have been done by the 
Chinese without our full envolvement. Because 
we are not fully involved.” (9) 
 
 “Issues of International Relations, they are not 
put as open issues to local people you only read 
them in one article in a newspaper” (14) 
 
 
 
- Interviewee no. 6 (Project Manager of an 
education project and Superior of a 
congregation) 
 
- Interviewee no. 9  (Director of NGO 
working on community development) 
 
- Interviewee no. 14 (Programme Manager at 
NGO working on Children Rights 
 
… domination by western countries 
 
“If I compare that to the traditional donors – 
maybe the only problem is that those traditional 
donors will try as much as possible to let you 
know that they are the ones who are giving you 
the money. And then for a poor person this may 
be very annoying, very annoying. You wouldn't 
wanna be reminded that you are poor, you 
know.” (2) 
 
- Interviewee no. 2 (Chief Legal Officer at the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs) 
 
- Interviewee no. 12 (News Analyst & Senior 
Reporter newspaper the Nation)  
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 “(If it's ended) Malawi will suffer a lot because 
it will then rely on the west. And the west, they 
are good in putting tough conditions on the 
money.” (12) 
 
“But for the west we find, there's nothing they do 
appart from squeezing you” (12) 
 
“We have problems accessing your markets, for 
instance in Europe” (17) 
 
“If you open markets then you don't need to 
pump in a lot of resources into developing 
countries.” (17) 
 
- Interviewee no. 17 (Chief Economist in the 
Monitoring and Evaluation division of the 
Ministry of Economic Planning and   
development) 
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Table 6: Economic and social benefits of the package deal projects 
 
Different discourses and matching 
statements 
Interviewee (number and position) 
 
Economic benefits of the projects 
 
 
“cut down the travel time by close to three 
hours” (3) 
 
“sensible projects” (3) 
 
 “Chitipa was a cut-off district. It was almost 
inaccessible … the people there felt cut out 
from the rest of Malawi” (3) 
 
“it does intensify economic activity” (3) 
 
“And Malawi may even host international 
meetings. And this has implications of 
economic value to Malawi.” (4) 
 
“Malawi government can generate a lot of 
foreign exchange out of the buildings” (4) 
 
“Now it takes only 2.5 hours to travel from 
Karonga to Chitipa” (4) 
 
“People are able to sell their products” (from 
Karonga and Chitipa) (11) 
 
“banks opened in Chitipa and Karonga” (11) 
 
“Before no one was controlling the 
businessmen using the old road, now they 
have to pay taxes” (11) 
 
“Economically there is a big change because 
people are able to invest in Chitipa now.” 
(13) 
 
“The conference center attracts tourists” (13) 
 
“All things they used, all materials, they 
came from China” (14) 
 
- Interviewee no. 3 (Legal Advisor on 
Business Environment at the Ministry of 
Trade) 
 
- Interviewee no. 4 (Project Manager at 
NGO working on the integration of 
people with disabilities) 
 
- Interviewee no. 11 (Vice Chairman of the 
board, headmaster of an NGO working on 
education) 
 
- Interviewee no. 13 (Coordinator at NGO 
working on microloans) 
 
- Interviewee no. 14 (Programme Manager 
at NGO working on Children Rights) 
 
- Interviewee no. 17 (Chief Economist in 
the Monitoring and Evaluation division of 
the Ministry of economic planning and 
development) 
 
- Interviewee no. 19 (Assistant Director of 
the Debt and Aid Division, Ministry of 
Finance, Chinese Desk) 
 
- Interviewee no. 18 (Director of the Debt 
and Aid Division of the Ministry of 
Finance) 
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“transport cost and time is reduced by the 
tarmac road” (14) 
 
“Now we can be able to host international 
events which can bring in money” (14) 
 
“Reduction in travel time has brought to the 
people of Malawi in that area a lot more 
opportunities in terms of trade and moving 
agriculture products from point A to B.” (17) 
 
“It is a very important project opening up 
areas where [a] few years ago were no proper 
links where transport of people, goods and 
services was a big problem” (18) 
 
“We did not have a proper parliament 
building … in old capital, Zomba – old 
building” (18) 
 
“For the international conference centre it's a 
bit of a challenge. It has not been put into 
use” (19) 
 
“Opportunity of generating income” (19) 
 
 
Social benefits of the projects 
 
 
“The parliament is very important to the 
political development of our country. That's 
where laws are made and any country that is 
democratic weighs a lot of its importance in 
this infrastructure” (4) 
 
“There is an influx of Chinese businesses in 
Malawi -a lot of people have been 
emplyoed.” (5) 
 
“Having an own parliament, it's free and not 
dependent on the president” (5) 
 
“Last time when the parliament was at the 
state house if you talked ill of the president, 
one MP would complain and say 'Am I going 
to leave this place safe?' So these things were 
also making the MPs not […] express 
- Interviewee no. 4 (Project Manager at 
FEDORA (Federation of  Disability 
Organisation in Malawi)) 
 
- Interviewee no. 5 (Director of an NGO 
working on HIV and community health)  
 
- Interviewee no. 12 (News Analyst & 
Senior Reporter newspaper the Nation)  
 
- Interviewee no. 13 (Coordinator at NGO 
working on microloans) 
 
- Interviewee no. 17 (Chief Economist in 
the Monitoring and Evaluation division of 
the Ministry of Economic Planning and 
development) 
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themselves openly. But now they are outside 
the state house they are able to speak […]. 
This time, the Members of Parliament are 
free to debate their issues.” (12) 
 
“Because of the university, now more people 
can be trained inside Malawi and do not have 
to leave the country” (13) 
 
“No capacity for many Malawian youths to 
get into tertiary education” (17) 
 
“In Malawi we have issues of available space 
at University-level” (18) 
 
“At university level, there is a capacity 
problem” (19) 
 
“And the university in Chiolo that again is 
something fabulous because I think in terms 
of the education sector in Malawi it's very 
much constrained by the available 
infrastructure. SO we know if a country is to 
develop, it means that it must educate its 
people. (20) 
 
“If there is this infrastructure development, I 
think the social aspect can always fit in 
because infrastructure can create a platform 
where people can do different things. […] So 
for example the university that should 
employ more than 500 people.” (20) 
 
 
- Interviewee no. 18 (Director of the Debt 
and Aid Division of the Ministry of 
Finance) 
 
- Interviewee no. 19 (Assistant Director of 
the Debt and Aid Division, Ministry of 
Finance, Chinese Desk) 
 
- Interviewee no. 20 (Communications, 
Research and Advocacy officer at an 
NGO working on slum upgrading, 
sanitation and housing) 
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Appendix 7: Interview questions 
 
7.1. Interviews with representatives of local development NGOs 
 
About the organization 
• Please describe your organization briefly!  
• How does your organization understand development? 
• What goals do you as an organization have? 
• How do you pursue these goals? 
• How big is the organization, how many employees are there? 
 
About the evaluation of the package deal 
• What do you know about Chinese-Malawian cooperation? 
• How do you evaluate Chinese-Malawian cooperation in general? 
• What is the perception of the Chinese presence in Malawi? 
• What has changed in the development of Malawi since the cooperation started? 
 
→ Introduction of the case: In 2007 a package deal has been set up and the cooperation was 
launched. This package deal included the construction of a new Parliament, a conference 
center, a university, a stadium and the longtime planed Karonga-Chipitha road. 
• How do you evaluate the impact of this package deal on development processes in 
 Malawi? 
• If you think of these projects, what value do they have for Malawian development? In 
 total and one by one...   
o new Parliament 
o conference center and hotel 
o university 
o stadium 
o the Karonga-Chitipa road 
• Do the projects create or intensify economic activities? 
• What is the value of infrastructure for the development of Malawi? 
• Who benefits most from the infrastructure projects (Malawian politicians, Malawian 
 population, Chinese government, Chinese businessmen)? 
• Do you think the projects reflect Malawian needs? 
• Do you see a symbolic value in the projects? 
o If yes – What is the symbolic value of the projects? 
o If no – Why not? 
• How do you evaluate the visibility of the changes caused by the projects? 
• Do you think it is important for the development of Malawi to be able to see changes 
 in the country – as e.g. through the projects of the package deal? 
• How would you describe the relation between Malawi and China compared to other 
 donors? 
• How do you evaluate the impact of the grants and loans? Do they express China’s trust 
 in Malawi’s potential or do they make Malawi dependent? 
• How do you evaluate China’s policy of not implementing political or economic 
 conditions? 
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• What do you think will happen if China’s support was ended? 
• Some scholars say, Chinese engagement in African countries is another form of 
 colonialism/  exploitation others say it is challenging western dominance and thus 
 empowering African  countries. What is your stance with regard to the projects 
 launched in 2008? 
• Do you have anything to add? 
• Do you have any suggestions of other organizations I should talk to?  
 
 
7.2. Interviews with Malawian civil servants 
 
About the ministry or agency 
◦ Please describe your ministry/agency and your working place briefly!  
 
About evaluation of the package deal 
→ My main interest is the infrastructure aspect of Chinese Malawian Cooperation; especially 
the projects launched in 2008: parliament, Karonga-Chitipa road, conference center & hotel, 
university, stadium.  
• Did I forget any important projects? What and where? 
• Do you have more detailed information about the agreements? 
 
• How do you evaluate the impact of this package deal on development processes in 
 Malawi? 
• If you think of these projects, what value do they have for Malawian development? In 
 total and one by one...   
o new Parliament 
o conference center and hotel 
o university 
o stadium 
o the Karonga-Chitipa road 
• Do the projects create or intensify economic activities? 
• What is the value of infrastructure for the development of Malawi? 
• Who benefits most from the infrastructure projects (Malawian politicians, Malawian 
 population, Chinese government, Chinese businessmen)? 
• Do you think the projects reflect Malawian needs? 
• Do you see a symbolic value in the projects? 
o If yes – What is the symbolic value of the projects? 
o If no – Why not? 
• How do you evaluate the visibility of the changes caused by the projects? 
• Do you think it is important for the development of Malawi to be able to see changes 
 in the country – as e.g. through the projects of the package deal? 
• How would you describe the relation between Malawi and China compared to other 
 donors? 
• How do you evaluate the impact of the grants and loans? Do they express China’s trust 
 in Malawi’s potential or do they make Malawi dependent? 
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• How do you evaluate China’s policy of not implementing political or economic 
 conditions? 
• What do you think will happen if China’s support was ended? 
• Some scholars say, Chinese engagement in African countries is another form of 
 colonialism/  exploitation others say it is challenging western dominance and thus 
 empowering African  countries. What is your stance with regard to the projects 
 launched in 2008? 
• Do you have anything to add? 
• Do you have any suggestions of other civil servants I should talk to? 
 
 
7.3. Interviews with employees at the Chinese embassy 
 
• My focus is on infrastructure projects but I would like to know in general in which 
 sectors the Chinese and the Malawian Government cooperate? 
• How do you evaluate the impact of the cooperation on Malawian development? 
• How does the PRC benefit from the cooperation? 
• As I already stated, my focus is on infrastructure projects which started when the 
 cooperation was launched in 2007.  
o Can give detailed information about the agreement which was set up in 2007? 
o How high were the loans and grants for each of the projects? 
o How does Malawi pay back? 
o How do you evaluate the impact of these projects for the development of Malawi? 
• The projects bring visible changes to Malawi’s landscape – Is there a specific goal to 
 this visibility?  
• In general, how do you evaluate the role of infrastructure for development? 
• What reactions of the Malawian population did you experience? 
• What reactions of the Chinese population did you experience? 
• How would you compare Chinese cooperation with Malawi to other/ traditional 
 donors? 
• Do you have anything to add? 
• Do you have any suggestions for other people to contact? 
 
 
7.4. Interviews with representatives of Chinese construction companies 
 
• Please give me a brief overview of the process of construction: start, end, process! 
• How many employees did/do you have? 
• How many employees are Malawians, how many are Chinese? 
• Can you give an overview of the financial structure, the funding of this project? 
• What was the total cost of the projects? 
• What are the conditions of the implementation? When does the money havet o be paid 
 back? 
• Who is/was responsible of the design of the project? 
• Who is/was responsible of the architecture of this project? 
• Whose ideas are guiding the construction process? 
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• Who is in charge of the maintenance? 
• What are future prospects of engagement for your company in Malawi? 
• How are the reactions to your projects you experience in Malawi? 
• Do you have anything to add? 
• Do you have any suggestions of persons I should talk to? 
  
89 
 
Appendix 8: Pictures of the package deal projects in Lilongwe28 
 
The conference center and hotel 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The conference center 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The five star hotel 
                                                          
28During my field visit I could only visit the projects which are placed in Lilongwe because of time constraints. 
So I was not able to take pictures of the Karonga-Chitipa road and the University of Science and Technology.  
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One of 15 presidential villas, part of the conference center and hotel complex 
 
The Parliament complex 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The parliament building 
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The entrance to the parliament complex  
 
